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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

COLLABORATIVE COMPETITION IN HOMELESS SERVICES: THREE ESSAYS
ON FEDERAL-LOCAL PARTNERSHIPS
The United States’ federal government funds homeless services provided at the
local level through the McKinney-Vento Act, encouraging collaboration among providers.
This dissertation studies three aspects of homelessness: merging of local planning bodies,
identification of homeless students, and the relationship between experiencing
homelessness in high school and long-term educational outcomes.
The first chapter studies the effect of merging Continuums of Care (CoCs), local
planning bodies for homeless services. While merging brings organizations into the same
network and could make use of economies of scale, it brings service provision to a lesslocal level, taking away responsiveness to the community and inter-jurisdictional
competition. I find merging actually reduces service provision and increases homelessness,
using a difference-in-differences design in an event study context.
The second chapter explores the effect of intergovernmental grants on the
identification of homeless students. I estimate for each state and year the percentile
(threshold) where there is the greatest discontinuity in a district’s likelihood of receiving a
homeless assistance grant. I find grants do not explain the increase in student
homelessness, using the thresholds in a fuzzy regression discontinuity design. The findings
show that worsening economic conditions likely explain the increase and policy should
address this increase in housing insecurity. I also find the grants do not increase the share
of homeless students scoring proficient on state tests.
The third chapter estimates how experiencing homelessness in high school relates
to rates of high school graduation and college-going. I find that students have lower
graduation rates even after adjusting for observable characteristics. However, the
magnitude differs depending on how one considers past experiences of homelessness.

KEYWORDS: Homelessness; Collaborative Governance; Urban Policy; Fiscal
Federalism; Difference-in-Differences; Regression Discontinuity
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
The United States’ federal government has taken a decentralized approach in many
of its programs addressing homelessness, the state of lacking fixed, stable, and adequate
nighttime shelter. Doing so conceivably provides funding and resources to communities in
need while giving local communities control over how to provide services. A decentralized
approach also encourages collaboration among providers by forcing providers to
coordinate to maximize grants to the community. Collaboration could improve
community-level outcomes by sharing information and eliminating some negative
externalities. However, incentives to gain resources incentivize competition. While service
providers have a collective goal, each still has an individual goal and aims to secure
resources to achieve that goal. Organizations, public administrators, and jurisdictions are
thus faced with conflicting incentives to both collaborate and compete with each other,
creating a governance structure of collaborative competition. In this dissertation, I study
three aspects of homelessness: merging of local planning bodies, identification of homeless
students, and the relationship between experiencing homelessness in high school and high
school graduation and college enrollment.
The first chapter exemplifies collaborative competition by studying the effect of
merging Continuums of Care (CoCs), local planning bodies for homeless services. HUD
has encouraged CoCs to merge since 2009 to increase coordination and decrease
homelessness, despite lacking evidence that merging leads to this effect. While merging
brings organizations into the same network and could make use of economies of scale, it
brings service provision to a less-local level, taking away responsiveness to the community
1

and inter-jurisdictional competition. It could also increase inter-organizational competition
by suddenly having more members in the network competing for resources. I find merging
reduces service provision and increases homelessness, using a difference-in-differences
design in an event study context. As persons experiencing homelessness are highly mobile,
I see how merging affects nearby CoCs and rule out migration as the explanation, leaving
the drop in service provision as the likely mechanism.
The second chapter explores the effect of intergovernmental grants on the
identification of students experiencing homelessness. The U.S. Department of Education
annually provides states grants to help identify and serve homeless students, which states
then sub-grant to school districts. In this context, school districts explicitly compete to
receive a grant, based on criteria such as need and capacity. I first rank districts within each
state and year for the 2014-18 school years based on their number of students experiencing
homelessness and assign each state a percentile of need. I then estimate for each state and
year the percentile (threshold) where, within a bandwidth of 5 percentiles, there is the
greatest discontinuity in a district’s likelihood of receiving a homeless assistance grant. I
find grants do not explain the increase in homelessness, using the thresholds in a fuzzy
regression discontinuity design to see the effect of receiving a grant on the identification
of students. The findings therefore show that worsening economic conditions likely explain
the increase and policy should address this increase in housing insecurity. I also find the
grants do not increase the share of homeless students scoring proficient on state tests,
possibly due to a decrease in local funds.
The third chapter estimates how experiencing homelessness in high school relates
to rates of high school graduation and college-going. I find that students have lower
2

graduation rates even after adjusting for observable characteristics, using administrative
data from an anonymous school district. However, the magnitude differs depending on how
one considers past experiences of homelessness. Additionally, students experiencing
homelessness in high school have a small gap in 2-year college going, but large disparities
in 4-year college going. These results imply a tradeoff between including students who
may have lasting negative effects from a past experience of homelessness and focusing on
those for whom likely have the greatest negative impact from homelessness. Further,
results suggest difficulty in comparing homelessness-housed educational disparities across
districts and states using different definitions. Identifying districts with the greatest
educational needs for their housing insecure students requires a unified measurement or
adjustments based on definition used.
Overall, the following chapters provide evidence that federal-local partnerships and
collaboration may not lead to desired outcomes, particularly when there exist incentives to
compete for resources. This challenges a large portion of the collaborative governance
literature, often assuming collaboration to improve outcomes and thus focus on how to
maintain collaborations. One reason for my alternative findings is the lack of quasiexperimental studies comparing many jurisdictions in the collaborative governance
literature. Many focus on short-term outcomes in a descriptive or qualitative framework
and study one jurisdiction. My dissertation instead suggests that, particularly from a federal
policy point of view, that encouraging for collaboration does not improve outcomes when
simultaneously imposing strong financial incentives for collaboration, such as for
Continuum of Care grants or McKinney-Vento Education for Homeless Children and
Youth grants.
3

CHAPTER 2. WORKING TOGETHER: THE IMPACT OF MERGING CONTINUUMS OF CARE ON
HOMELESSNESS AND HOMELESS SERVICES

2.1

Introduction
Few programs reflect the federal government’s prioritization of coordination in

public service provision more than homeless services (Hambrick and Rog 2000). Homeless
services, starting as largely independent organizations, created formal and informal
networks when the federal government began providing funding in the 1980s. Federal
funding also led to the creation of about 480 Continuums of Care (CoCs) in 1994: local
planning districts where individual homeless service providers within each geographic
region must formally coordinate service provision with each other and the federal
government (Burt 2002). The number of people experiencing homelessness – sleeping in a
place not meant for human habitation or a shelter – on a given night had been decreasing
since 2007.1 However, it has recently increased each year since 2016 to about 550,000
persons in 2019, increasing the need for effective services (Department of Housing and
Urban Development 2020). Despite CoCs’ creation about 25 years ago to benefit from
coordination, analysis of CoCs’ ability to solve homeless services’ coordination problem
and improve outcomes is limited (Mosley and Jarpe 2019; Valero and Jang 2016).
Since at least 2009, HUD has strongly encouraged CoCs to merge to further
increase coordination among service providers, with about 101 CoCs merging into 46

1

Specifically, a homeless person lacks a fixed, regular, and adequate nighttime residence. This includes
those living in a shelter. It also includes those imminently losing their primary nighttime residence and
those fleeing domestic violence or other dangerous situation. Unlike some other countries, such as the
United Kingdom and Australia, homelessness in this context does not include those sharing housing due to
economic hardship or a similar condition, i.e., doubled-up.
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between 2000 and 2018 (Federal Register 2009). Merging may increase coordination,
economies of scale, and internalization of negative externalities by forcing CoCs to have a
larger network and share resources. Alternatively, CoCs may also lose specialization and
responsiveness to stakeholders by needing to serve a broader population as well as positive
effects of interjurisdictional competition, meaning merging may not lead to improved
outcomes or service provision. In a guidance issued to CoCs in February 2018, HUD states
merging CoCs can lead to improved coordination of services, more efficient resource
allocation and planning, and increase competitiveness for resources (Department of
Housing and Urban Development 2018). HUD further explicitly states potential benefits
and challenges to CoCs’ merging, shown in Figure 2.1, similar to other arguments for the
consolidation of government jurisdictions such as cost-savings and improvement in quality
(Duncombe and Yinger 2007; Gordon and Knight 2008; Taylor et al. 2017). This resource
provides possible goals of merging to measure its effect. For example, merging could
increase a CoC’s competitiveness for annual funding, so federal CoC awards can be a
possible outcome. Despite the possible benefits of merging CoCs for homeless services,
few scholars have studied whether these benefits exist in practice as opposed to solely in
theory and outweigh potential costs, such as lack of responsiveness to the community.
Thus, an empirical evaluation of merging’s effect on homelessness and operational
outcomes can better inform the welfare implications of merging given the conflicting
effects on responsiveness, economies of scale, and externalities.
*** Insert Figure 2.1 ***
I ask if merging CoCs decreases homelessness and improves operational outcomes,
using panel data from 2007-2017 and comparing variation over time in homelessness and
5

operations in merging CoCs to ones that did not merge or merged at different times. To do
so, I estimate the effect of merging CoCs on homelessness and operational outcomes using
a generalized difference-in-differences design in an event study context, aggregating CoCs
to post-merger boundaries and analyzing changes after merging. Contrary to the policy’s
goal of decreasing homelessness, I find merging CoCs does not decrease homelessness
within the merged geographic area. Results instead suggest a statistically significant
increase of about 40% of the pre-treatment mean in chronic homelessness, persons with a
disability and persistent homelessness.2 In terms of operations, although merging caused a
long-term increase in participation in homeless management information systems for
permanent supportive housing (PSH), a sign of increased coordination, and federal award
per service provider, merging also decreased PSH beds, the main form of homeless
services.
Because more efficient homeless services could attract homeless persons from
nearby CoCs, I also estimate the effect of a CoC’s merging on nearby CoCs’ outcomes to
further explore the mechanism of consolidation’s effect and the contradictory finding of an
increase in chronic homelessness. Chronic homelessness does not decrease and possibly
increases in nearby CoCs, suggesting within-CoC effects are not driven only by migration
from nearby CoCs.
I contribute to the literature by conducting empirical analyses to study an intergovernmental public service provision system and special districts created to maximize the
benefits of coordination while limiting costs from both coordination and externalities,

2

Chronically homeless persons have a disability and have experienced homelessness for one or more years
or experienced at least four episodes of any of the three categories in the last three years for a year
combined.
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which also incentivizes both coordination and competition (Hambrick and Rog 2000;
Feiock 2007; Bel and Warner 2015; Hawkins et al. 2016). I also contribute to the literature
on how regional government formats affect outcomes by showing consolidation does affect
outcomes and operations (Lee et al. 2012; Chen et al. 2016; Hawkins et al. 2016; Taylor et
al. 2017). Most previous related studies have analyzed school districts or local
governments, which have different incentives for coordination and competition as well as
revenue sources (Duncombe and Yinger 2007; Gordon and Knight 2008; Hawkins et al.
1991; Roesel 2017; Taylor et al. 2017). I lastly add to the literature on the economics of
homelessness by showing that merging CoCs likely does not lead to improved outcomes
by internalizing externalities.
2.2

The Continuum of Care (CoC) Program
2.2.1

Structure and Responsibilities of Continuums of Care

A CoC, by its namesake, prioritizes coordination. Originally a term from healthcare
services, a medical continuum of care links all treatments and services to create a holistic
plan to address the problem, share information among stakeholders, and reduce gaps in
service provision. Similarly, HUD requires CoCs to address multiple aspects of
homelessness and create a system of services. HUD allowed communities to organize CoCs
themselves to maximize the benefits of coordination. CoCs could take any format, so long
as every individual service provider (ISP) receiving federal funds was within a CoC and
the geographic boundaries of a given CoC were the size of a Community Development

7

Block Grant district at the smallest, e.g. downtown Chicago, and state at the largest, e.g.
Wyoming.3
Homeless services generally take one of four forms through ISPs that serve
homeless persons (Department of Housing and Urban Development 2017). Emergency
shelters offer only temporary shelter. Transitional shelters provide shelter and some
services like continuing education for a period of up to two years to prepare homeless
persons for independent housing. Permanent housing provides long-term housing with
many services, often providing a “Housing First” approach offering housing without prior
conditions such as sobriety. HUD considers homeless persons in permanent supportive
housing no longer homeless. Lastly, services may not provide shelter, but instead, support
or resources to help homeless or homeless-at-risk persons like rent support.4 Other types
of services exist, such as rapid rehousing, but generally fall into one of these four
categories. ISPs also have varying characteristics and their own goals, such as focusing on
a specific homeless subpopulation – e.g., single men, women and children, or persons with
a mental illness (O’Flaherty 1996).
CoCs differ in coordination formats for their ISPs and leadership styles, following
similar patterns to network governance structures in general (Provan and Kenis 2008).
First, CoCs have varying levels of formal coordination. While ISPs within some CoCs have
many formal interactions, such as monthly meetings, ISPs in others only interact to apply
for annual funding from HUD (Burt 2002). Second, a CoC’s lead organization is typically
a nonprofit, government office, or public-private partnership. The ability to have different

3
4

See Appendix Figure B1 for maps of CoC boundaries.
See Appendix C1 for definitions of each service type.
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leadership structures allows CoCs to make formal coordination networks fit their needs
and priorities (Valero and Jang 2016). The freedom of organization would ideally allow
each CoC to lower costs and identify externalities imposed or resource misallocation, while
maximizing responsiveness to its stakeholders, lacking when HUD initially began funding
homeless services.
2.2.2

Coordinating ISPs

HUD created CoCs in 1994 in response to the high coordination costs in homeless
services. HUD originally funded thousands of ISPs using about $350 million through the
McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act of 1987 (M-V). Practitioners soon realized
externalities and coordination costs from the disorganization in homeless services hindered
them from effectively serving homeless persons (Burt 2002). First, organizations impose
externalities on each other from not considering other actors. For example, if an
organization decreases its service quality, it may lead to users going to other organizations,
increasing their costs (O’Flaherty 2003). Further, aggregate service provision may be
below optimal if each ISP acts independently by benefiting from the publicness of services
(Samuelson 1954). Second, ISPs competing for federal funds expend resources on applying
for the funds instead of providing services. HUD only necessitates showing need instead
of effectiveness or coordination, meaning ISPs are not directly incentivized to be more
effective. Third, the diversity of services complicated evaluating services and
determination of funding for HUD because of unstandardized outcomes and a large number
of applicants, typically thousands each year (Burt 2002). Funding, for example, would
potentially compare a large shelter for single men in New York City to a small transitional

9

housing organization for young mothers in the Midwest, despite different goals, services,
and contexts.
These costs and externalities could be lowered by ISPs’ coordinating using joint
decision making or compensating each other for externalities imposed, so long as
transaction or coordination costs are low (Coase 1960). Scholars suggest coordination can
internalize externalities and increase goal congruence between actors (Hawkins et al. 1991;
Norris 2001; Bel and Warner 2015; Chen et al. 2016; Shresthaa et al. 2014). Feiock (2007)
finds coordination to be a dynamic process, with both informal and formal actions related
to costs. Four costs exist: information, negotiation, enforcement, and agency. Information
costs refer to the costs of gathering information on preferences of stakeholders, and
possible benefits and resources available. Negotiation costs refer to work dividing the
benefits gained. Enforcement costs refer to costs related to maintaining agreements. Lastly,
agency costs refer to being responsive to constituents' and clients' needs and preferences.
Unlike externalities, however, coordination costs are usually accounting costs because they
result from direct actions, such as negotiating with another service provider, and can be
directly monetized, either as labor or capital costs. Coordination in homeless services may
be negotiating with other ISPs what services a given ISP will offer or how to divide federal
grants to improve overall outcomes.
As coordination costs exist, limiting externalities would need to be balanced with
coordination costs. Coordinating ISPs through CoCs could lower coordination costs while
still receiving its benefits by being local planning bodies for homeless services. CoCs
would decrease the number of applications HUD reviewed annually for funding to a few
hundred, while forcing ISPs to create community homeless assistance plans, ideally leading
10

to lower homelessness with more efficiency (Department of Housing and Urban
Development 2009). Thus, HUD and CoCs have a symbiotic relationship, where HUD
needs CoCs to coordinate ISPs and serve homeless persons while CoCs rely on HUD for a
stream of resources. CoCs, however, also made inter-jurisdictional competition as well as
creating incentives both for competition and coordination within each.
2.2.3

Coordinating CoCs

Despite its intention of increasing coordination in homeless services, HUD also
induced interjurisdictional externalities by having CoCs compete for federal funds. For
example, when evaluating CoCs’ funding applications, HUD rates CoCs based on their
improvement in outcomes for homeless persons, such as decreasing levels of homelessness,
and coordination efforts of stakeholders. Lee (2019) finds CoCs with larger decreases in
homelessness compared to other CoCs receive more funding from HUD. In evaluating
CoCs’ performances, however, HUD does not consider how interjurisdictional
externalities produced by homeless services may affect other CoCs’ performances
(Department of Housing and Urban Development 2009). As the level of funds HUD can
distribute is fixed in the short-term, CoCs have little incentive to internalize the
performance of others. Externalities produced by services, positive or negative, like the
migration of homeless persons from one CoC to a neighboring one, are not internalized.
Figure 2.2 shows the format CoCs created: a hierarchy of funding and goals where
externality and coordination costs occur, requiring a balance between the benefits and costs
of consolidation. First, HUD at the top funds CoCs that then fund ISPs. The hierarchy can
also be viewed as a map of each actor’s goal. HUD desires lower homelessness across the
country. However, as CoCs cover distinct geographic areas, they desire lower
11

homelessness only within their area. ISPs desire lower homelessness from the narrowest
geographic or service area. Lastly, HUD, CoCs, and ISPs all benefit from more efficient
service provision, freeing resources for other purposes.
*** Insert Figure 2.2 ***
Coordination is represented by the solid lines. ISPs must coordinate with their CoC,
which must then coordinate with HUD. Coordination costs decrease for HUD compared to
the period before CoCs as HUD decentralized costs to CoCs. As coordination costs include
costs from gathering information on and monitoring performances of CoCs (Feiock 2007),
the costs have a direct relationship with the number of agents being funded. Cutting the
number of agents from several thousand to a few hundred should drastically cut
coordination costs for HUD. CoCs incur coordination costs as they must gather information
on ISPs and monitor outcomes, but only coordinate with an average of about nineteen ISPs,
meaning costs should not be as high as in the pre-CoC format (Department of Housing and
Urban Development 2017).
Externalities occur through competition as ISPs compete within their CoC for
funding (inter-organizational competition) while CoCs compete for HUD funding (interjurisdictional competition), represented by dashed arrows. At one extreme, if only one CoC
exists, it internalizes all externalities, so it recognizes any increase in homelessness. If two
CoCs exist, each does not internalize externalities, meaning if one’s actions, service levels,
or policies affect homelessness in the other CoC it does not consider the externality of
increased homelessness. Externality costs continue increasing with additional CoCs
(Hawkins et al. 1991). The externality from an increase in homelessness, public costs of
serving homeless persons such as healthcare and shelter, could increase these
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interjurisdictional costs with estimates of the annual cost of homelessness generally
ranging between $5,100 and $38,000 (Flaming et al. 2015; Evans et al. 2016; Hunter et al.
2017). ISPs and CoCs must then balance the tension between accomplishing shared
network goals through coordination while achieving individual goals, which consolidation
could influence by affecting coordination and externalities (Piatak et al., 2018).
First, merging may increase coordination by having additional organizations within
one CoC network as opposed to spread over several jurisdictions. Sharing the same CoC
resources as more ISPs and working with more organizations could lead to better
coordination as opposed to being split over multiple CoCs. I measure coordination through
the participation rate in the CoC’s Homeless Management Information System (HMIS) for
organizations providing permanent supportive housing (PSH). Although not a direct
measure of coordination, HMIS is a unified data system for all service providers in the CoC
that collects client-level data and can lead to information sharing. A larger percentage of
organizations participating in the system would suggest coordination increased in the CoC
after merging.
Merging may also increase economies of scale by reducing duplicative services,
leading to more efficient services and being more competitive for CoC grants. I first
measure efficiency and competitiveness through the amount of federal CoC grants in
dollars, or award, the CoC receives from HUD for homeless services as HUD states in its
guidance merging may lead to more efficient services and therefore funding. I then see the
effect of merging on the number of homeless service providers in the CoC receiving HUD
CoC grants as removing duplicative services and increasing inter-organizational
competition may decrease the number of organizations. Consolidation may increase
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economies of scale by allowing services to better use shared infrastructure or
administrative resources (Duncombe and Yinger 2007; Gordon and Knight 2008). I thus
combine the two measures into federal award per grant recipient to capture a form of
economies of scale. More efficient services may also lead to more service provision by
increased inter-organizational competition requiring more services. I measure service
provision through the total number of beds and PSH beds. I separate PSH beds as its use
and funding have increased dramatically over the period and become the preferred form of
service.
On the other hand, merging may decrease the benefits of decentralized service
provision. More CoCs covering smaller geographic areas may have benefits as programs
can be more responsive to their stakeholders and tailored for each CoC’s needs (Gordon
and Knight 2006). For example, some CoCs, particularly in warmer climates, have a higher
proportion of unsheltered homeless persons (Corinth and Lucas 2018). As unsheltered and
sheltered homeless persons have different needs, namely shelter, ISPs in a more responsive
CoC can offer more services for unsheltered persons, ideally being more effective and
lowering homelessness. Merging CoCs may decrease responsiveness by forcing service
providers to cover a larger area and broader population. As such, I first estimate the effect
of merging on the diversity of service provision through a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
(HHI). To create an HHI, I use six service types: the number of beds for emergency
shelters, transitional housing, and PSH, further split by whether beds are for households
with or without children. Similarly, people experiencing homelessness come from various
backgrounds and have different experiences while homeless. As merging could make CoCs
less responsive to the needs of people they serve, it may not decrease homelessness in less
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common subpopulations. In addition to testing merging’s effect on overall homelessness,
I estimate the effect of merging on four separate subpopulations: unsheltered, sheltered,
chronic, and non-chronic.
Unsheltered homeless persons are those sleeping on streets or places not meant for
human habitation, whereas sheltered homeless persons stay in a place meant for human
habitation, such as a shelter or hotel. Chronically homeless persons are those who
experience several bouts or extended periods of homelessness, which is generally
considered one of the most severe cases of homelessness. Every homeless person is either
sheltered or unsheltered and chronic or non-chronic.
Differential policy effects between chronic and non-chronic homelessness are
notable in previous literature as chronically homeless persons often have disabilities and
are cost-drivers of services despite being only being about 18% of the homeless population
(Corinth 2017). Given their additional vulnerability and high resource-use, policymakers
may weigh effects on chronically homeless persons more than non-chronic persons, as
shown by ending chronic homelessness’s being a priority of HUD (Department of Housing
and Urban Development 2017). At the community level, if consolidating CoCs decreases
chronic homelessness, it would be a signal that CoCs became more efficient and have lower
public costs.
By creating CoCs, HUD introduced coordination to help limit negative interorganizational externalities, while also introducing inter-jurisdictional externalities.
HUD’s encouragement of merging CoCs to increase coordination is meant to decrease
these new negative externalities through internalization and ultimately decrease
homelessness. Given the conflicting effects on responsiveness, economies of scale, and
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externalities, I, therefore, ask if consolidation achieves the goal of improving coordination
and operations and decreasing homelessness.
2.3

Empirical Strategy
2.3.1

Generalized Difference-in-Differences in an Event Study Context

To empirically study the effect of consolidating CoCs on homelessness, I use a
generalized difference-in-differences (DiD) in an event study context design, estimating
both average and time-varying treatment effects. The unit of observation is the CoC level,
based on 2016 boundaries. Aggregating historical CoCs to their 2016 boundaries allows
analysis of changes in outcomes within those geographic areas, where CoCs never merging
have the same boundaries in 2016 as before. 5 As control variables are at the county level,
but some CoCs are smaller than a county, I population-weight controls for these CoCs and
aggregate to cover the county (Appendix Table C2). 6
As data are for 2007-2017, I limit possible treatment years to 2010-2013 to ensure
adequate pre- and post-treatment years and a balanced panel with respect to years from
merging, ensuring each treated CoC has an equal share of periods spent untreated and
treated in the estimation sample and inference is only drawn from equal times from merger
(Goodman-Bacon 2019).7 For example, even though I have a full, balanced sample from
2007-2017, a CoC merging in 2010 has an analysis sample of 2007-2014, whereas a CoC

5

By historical CoCs, I refer to the geographic boundaries of CoCs before their merging.
For example, there is a CoC for Cook County, IL, as well as one for “downtown” Chicago. I population
weight control variables, such as the poverty rate, and aggregate to create one CoC covering all of Cook
County. Variables that are counts, such as the number of homeless persons, are only aggregated and not
weighted.
7 I also estimate a sensitivity check using a balanced panel by time as opposed to by years from treatment,
finding similar results (Figure B11).
6
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merging in 2013 has an analysis sample of 2010-2017. I identify mergers based on
reporting in HUD’s point-in-time count resource which states which CoCs merged and
when (Appendix Table C3). CoCs merging in other years are dropped from the sample.
Lastly, although some CoCs merged multiple times over the period, I consider treatment
the first merger for main models, while re-estimating models dropping CoCs merging
multiple times as a sensitivity check. About five mergers occurred per year on average
during treatment years (Appendix Figure B2). This creates a panel of 43 CoCs merging
into 18 for analysis.
First consider a more traditional, two-period DiD in Equation (1) where
PostMerger is an indicator taking the value of one in years, t, after a CoC, c, has merged
the first time and zero otherwise.
(1)

𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑐,𝑡 = 𝛽1 (𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑀𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟)𝑐,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑋𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛼𝑐 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑐,𝑡

𝛽1 is the effect of a CoC’s first time merging on homeless outcomes compared to the
period before merging and outcomes of the control group, CoCs never merging or merging
at other times. I include CoC fixed effects, 𝛼𝑐 , to control for all time-invariant
characteristics of the CoC, including whether it is a treatment or control CoC. Year fixed
effects are 𝛾𝑡 , controlling for any unobserved characteristic in a given year which applies
to all CoCs, such as the national economy. Standard errors, 𝜀𝑐,𝑡 , are clustered at the CoC
level in all models as error terms likely correlate within a CoC over time.
𝑋𝑐,𝑡 is a vector of time-varying covariates at the CoC level controlling for economic
and demographic factors, with each relationship with the outcome in vector 𝜃 interpreted
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as within-CoC relationships.8 I choose control variables based on previous research of
what may affect homelessness. As economic factors correlate with homelessness (Byrne et
al. 2013), I control for per capita income, unemployment rate, labor force per capita,
poverty rate, fair market rent for zero-bedroom housing, and new low-income housing tax
credit units. I also control for demographic factors, including population density and share
of the population Black, Asian, and Hispanic as homelessness disproportionately impacts
these groups (Department of Housing and Urban Develop 2017). Last, I control for if the
state's governor is a Democrat and the state's Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(TANF) benefits for two-person families.
To estimate time-varying effects of merging CoCs on outcomes, I estimate
Equation (2) where τ is year of treatment, making j years from treatment, which occurs at
j=0.
(2)

𝑗=−2

𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑐,𝑡 = ∑𝑗=−3 𝛽𝑗 (𝑀𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑑𝑐 ∗ 𝟏[𝑡 − 𝜏 = 𝑗])

𝑗=4

+ ∑𝑗=0 𝛽𝑗 (𝑀𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑑𝑐 ∗ 𝟏[𝑡 − 𝜏 = 𝑗]) + 𝜃𝑋𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛼𝑐 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑐,𝑡
This method compares variation in merged CoCs to variation in CoCs that did not merge
or merged at other times, relative to a base year, conditional on CoC and year fixed effects
and time-varying control variables (Sun and Abraham 2020). The identifying assumption
is the CoCs would have followed a similar trend but for the merging. I create a set of
dummy variables for each year from treatment to include in the model except the base year
of j= -1. The interpretation of a given coefficient is the average treatment effect of merging
for each period relative to the difference between treatment and control CoCs in the base

8 I estimate sensitivity checks with no control variables as treatment could have been correlated with
controls, masking the true treatment effect. Additionally, if treatment were random, controls would not be
needed econometrically. The results are similar to the main results (Figure B10).
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year. As the calendar year for a given j differs depending on the event cohort, the control
group at j= -1 becomes a weighted average of the control group’s outcomes, after
conditioning on controls, where the weight is the number of CoCs merging in that year
(Sun and Abraham 2020). For example, five of the eighteen mergers occurred in 2010, so
control group outcomes in 2009, the calendar year when j= -1 for this cohort, has a weight
of 27.8%. As the panel is balanced by years from treatment and there are exclusive dummy
variables for j≠ -1, the conditional average difference between treatment and control CoCs
in j= -1 becomes standardized to zero as the reference group. When j≠ -1, 𝛽𝑗 is then the
differences between treatment and control CoCs for a given year from treatment, implicitly
weighted by the number of treatments in a given calendar year as before, relative to the
reference difference, and thus a DiD.9
Equation (2) also allows tests for a placebo effect when j<0 as there should be no
effect before treatment (Granger 1969). As a preview, results cannot find statistically
significant evidence against the parallel trends assumption, as coefficients before treatment
are statistically insignificant and generally close to zero. I also conduct a Fisher unit root
test for all outcomes and reject the null hypothesis that a unit root exists in all panels.
*** Insert Table 2.1 ***
2.3.2

Data Sources

All outcomes are listed in Table 2.1 under “Operational Variables” and
“Homelessness Variables.” Data on CoC mergers and the number of homeless service beds
come from HUD's 2007-2017 Housing Inventory Count reports. I additionally gather

9 I additionally follow Sun and Abraham’s (2020) method of an interaction-weighted estimator for
estimating a DiD, which estimates the event study by treatment cohort and weights coefficients by each
cohort’s share of total treatments, finding results almost exactly the same as main results shown.
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information on HUD CoC grants from HUD Exchange’s awards and allocation page. All
outcome variables except HMIS participation rate and HHI are in rates of per 10,000 CoC
residents.
For homelessness outcomes, I use the number of persons counted as homeless on
a given night per capita. Since 2005, CoCs collect data on the number of homeless persons
annually one night every January following a national definition and procedure. Although
counts existed before 2005, most were done by local governments or organizations, and
thus not comparable across localities or over time. HUD point-in-time (PIT) counts, on the
other hand, follow a definition and methodology, providing comparable estimates of
homelessness across local communities and time (Department of Housing and Urban
Development 2014). Having them occur at the same time also helps prevent duplicate
counts of persons experiencing homelessness. However, I drop data for 2005 and 2006 as
they were the first years of the counts and lack accuracy. While other measures, such as
time from entering shelter to exiting or percentage of formerly homeless persons
experiencing homelessness again would also provide information on the effectiveness of
merging, these measures have only been available at the CoC level since 2015. The average
number of homeless persons per 10,000 CoC residents was about 20, and chronically
homeless about 4, although large variation also exists (Table 2.1).
Data on per capita income come from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The
unemployment rate and the labor force are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Data on
new low-income housing tax credit developments and fair market rents come from HUD’s
low-income housing tax credit database. State-level variables are from the University of
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Kentucky Center for Poverty Research. All other control variables come from the
American Community Survey.
2.4

Results
2.4.1

Descriptive Analysis

I first create descriptive trends (Appendix Figure B3) to show average outcomes
between treated and control CoCs after merging by years from merging (see Appendix A
for a description of the weighting mechanism). Although not causal, these figures provide
information about how the levels and trends of outcomes differed between merging and
never-merging CoCs. Inter-organizational coordination as measured by the HMIS
participation rate is of particular interest, while starting about eighteen percentage points
lower than never-merging CoCs, has drastically increased by about twenty percentage
points, or 35% (Panel A). Additionally, although homelessness decreases in merging CoCs
after merging, never-merging CoCs also have a decrease, including chronic homelessness,
suggesting merging may not be the cause (Panels H-L).
2.4.2

Homelessness Outcomes

*** Insert Table 2.2 and Figure 2.3 ***
I present the average effects of the generalized DiD for homelessness outcomes in
Table 2.2. Average effects are the average difference in the outcome after merging
compared to CoCs never merging or merging at different times. Along with point estimates,
I present changes as the percentage change in pre-treatment means. Consolidation likely
did not decrease homelessness. On average, the rate of homelessness increased by about
0.8 persons per 10,000 population, a 6% increase from the rate of homelessness in merging
CoCs before they merged. The lower bound of the confidence interval of reduction in
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overall homelessness is 13%, meaning merging at best led to a small decrease in
homelessness. Contrary to the stated goal, merging increased chronic homelessness,
significant statistically, by about 0.7 persons per 10,000 capita or 40%. However, while
there is evidence for an increase, there is large variation and standard errors, meaning the
magnitude of the increase is less clear.
Figure 2.3, corresponding to Equation (2), plots coefficients as solid bullet points
by years from treatment, where the base year is j= -1, with shaded areas showing 95%
confidence intervals, and provides further support by showing effects of merging over time.
These add to the understanding of the effect of merging as the effect may increase over
time or fade out, also allowing to see pre-trends. Chronic homelessness shows an
immediate increase that stays constant in the long-term. While individual coefficients are
not significant, they are jointly significant, providing evidence merging increased chronic
homelessness. Additionally, differences before treatment (left of the vertical blue line) are
insignificant and close to zero, suggesting chronic homelessness in merging and control
CoCs followed similar trends before merging.
Other populations show no change, not changing at any point as its coefficients are
almost always near zero. 10 Although overall homelessness decreased after merging as
shown in the descriptive analysis, merging was likely not the cause.
2.4.3

Operational Outcomes

*** Insert Table 2.3 and Figure 2.4 ***
10

As I test several hypotheses, it could be the significant results are from repeated use of the same data. To
correct for this, I use a Bonferroni correction in each domain of homelessness and operations. This involves
dividing the critical p-values by the number of hypotheses, five and seven, respectively, or new statistically
significant p-values of 0.01 and 0.0071. Chronic homelessness is no longer significant when using the
correction due to the large variation in effects. Evidence may therefore be limited.
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I present the average effects of merging on operational outcomes in Table 2.3, with
treatment effects by year from treatment in Figure 2.4. First, merging increased
participation in HMIS for PSH servicers by an average of 13 percentage points, suggesting
merging did increase coordination among ISPs. This effect increased over time, rising to
about 30 percentage points five years after treatment (Figure 2.4, panel A). The increasing
coordination through sharing information may therefore take time and not be a sudden
change. Control and merging CoCs also had similar trends before merging, suggesting
coordination was not already increasing at the time of the mergers.
Merging also decreased the number of service providers on average and increased
the federal CoC grant award per provider relative to control CoCs by 27% and 14%,
respectively, providing evidence that merging increased economies of scale by having
resources concentrated in fewer organizations. However, time-varying effects suggest the
number of organizations was already decreasing, breaking the parallel trends assumption.
On the other hand, award per service provider does not break the assumption, although it
seems to have increased within two years after which then stayed constant (Figure 2.4,
panel F).
PSH also decreased after merging, although the large standard errors suggest the
magnitude of the decrease ranges from small to large. Time-varying effects show the large
variation in average effects likely results from later years after merging. Figure 2.4, panel
C shows an immediate decrease in PSH beds with a more precise estimate between 4% and
36%. PSH continues to decrease to an average of 30% two years after treatment. The effect
of consolidation becomes insignificant after three years due to variation in effects across
CoCs, although coefficients are similar. Pre-trends also seem to support the parallel trends
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assumption and identification. Merging then likely decreases PSH beds in the short-term
with a more ambiguous long-term effect.
As the HHI did not significantly change, CoCs may have increased economies of
scale by removing duplicate services after merging. On the other hand, service provision
as measured by beds did not increase and instead decreased in PSH beds, meaning
increased funding per service provider did not translate into increased service provision as
measured by the number of beds.11
2.4.4

Interjurisdictional Effects

To further explore the mechanism of the increase in chronic homelessness and
possible migration, I extend the DiD to interjurisdictional effects through changes in
outcomes in the rest of the state’s and neighboring CoCs. As operations and homelessness
in a given CoC may have spillover effects, analyzing the possibility can lead to a fuller
understanding of merging’s causal impacts. For example, a neighboring CoC may increase
its services as a response to a merging CoC’s decrease in services. Alternatively, if merging
decreased homelessness in another CoC, aggregate outcomes would improve. Lastly, if
nearby CoCs saw an equal decrease in chronic homelessness then migration could explain
the increase within merging CoCs.
I first compare CoCs in the rest of the state as all CoCs within a state share the same
state government and have overlapping stakeholders. To create the outcomes, I total the
outcomes for the state’s CoCs and subtract the CoC’s levels. Second, I compare
neighboring CoCs as a unit as neighboring CoCs likely have similar markets and clients

11

All effects on operational outcomes are still significant after using a Bonferroni correction with a new pvalue of 0.0071.
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and increases the likelihood of migration by homeless persons. To construct these
outcomes, I use Census records of neighboring counties and then aggregate to the CoC
level. I then total the outcomes for all neighboring CoCs for each CoC.
First, almost no interjurisdictional effects seem to exist for operational outcomes
for the rest of state or neighboring CoCs (Appendix Tables B1/B2 and Figures B4/B5).
Second, nearby CoCs cannot fully explain the increase in chronic homelessness in merging
CoCs, which is evidence against full migration (Appendix Tables B3/B4). Merging had no
or little effect on chronic homeless in CoCs in the rest of the state. Estimates for
neighboring CoCs suggest an increase in chronic homelessness or a very small decrease at
most. Additionally, whereas chronic homelessness increased immediately in merging
CoCs, it is a steady increase in neighboring CoC (Figure B7, Panel D). Third, while
statistically insignificant, neighboring CoCs see a decrease in total and non-chronic
homelessness of at most less than 1%, with up to a possible increase of 17%. Last, effects
on neighboring CoCs' homelessness tend to be higher than the rest of state homelessness,
suggesting neighboring CoCs to be more strongly connected than CoCs in the rest of the
state. Overall, merging seems to have not improved overall welfare in terms of the number
of homeless persons and chronically homeless persons’ possible migration to merging
CoCs does not explain their increase.
2.4.5

Sensitivity Checks

I also estimate five sensitivity checks: CoCs only merging once, dropping CoCs
which may have not conducted a homelessness count, dropping control variables from
regressions, and using a panel balanced with respect to calendar years instead of time from
treatment. First, as some CoCs merge multiple times, but I only consider the first merger
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as treatment, I re-estimate event study models dropping CoCs that merged again in future
years to keep the intensity of treatment the same across merging CoCs. In theory, merging
could change the likelihood of future mergers. Additionally, if merging has short-term
costs, such as decreased beds, which revert to normal in the long-run, multiple mergers
could mask these differences. Appendix Figure B8 shows the estimates. Results are similar
to main models. Changes in chronic homelessness are no longer statistically significant,
but are also not statistically different from main models.
Second, some CoCs only conduct counts of homeless persons every other year for
subpopulations. Although most CoCs conduct counts every year currently, this was not
always the case, meaning measurement error through using a previous year’s count could
bias results. I re-estimate event study models for outcomes dropping observations where
the change in the subpopulation was zero, as these are likely CoCs that did not count that
subpopulation that year. Results are again very similar to main models (Figure B9).
Third, I re-estimate models dropping time-varying control variables. I do this as
treatment could have been correlated with controls, masking the true treatment effect.
Additionally, if treatment were random, controls would not be needed econometrically. No
results change in statistical or practical significance. Figure B10 shows that results are
robust and still do not violate the parallel trends assumption. Interestingly, the estimate for
chronic homelessness is much more statistically significant and some by-year coefficients
are even significant, although the magnitudes are almost the same as main models.
Last, I re-estimate time-varying models using an unbalanced panel, meaning
additional pre- and post-treatment years are included but coefficients are only
representative of late or early mergers. While providing more years of information, other
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factors correlated with merging and outcomes, particularly further away from treatment,
may influence results. However, most results are still similar to main regressions, although
results do suggest effects to persist over time (Appendix Figure B11). For example, the
number of PSH beds per 10,000 population decreases by about two immediately after
merging and this decrease continues for seven years on average (Panel C). This provides
evidence against the decrease being only an implementation issue and instead a longlasting change in services. Additionally, it seems in Panel J that chronic homelessness
continues to increase over time. Taken together, main estimates may understate the true
effect of merging on the decrease in PSH beds and chronic homelessness.
2.5

Discussion
Based on these analyses, I find that merging CoCs does not achieve the policy goal

of reducing homelessness and instead decreases PSH beds and likely increases chronic
homelessness in the long-term. While homelessness decreased in CoCs after merging as
shown in descriptive analyses, merging does not seem to have been the cause. Analyzing
how merging affected nearby CoCs also alleviates concerns of full migration as nearby
CoCs did not see a decrease in homelessness. Last, merging does seem to have increased
coordination, shown by the increased participation in HMIS and an increase in federal
award per service provider.
In terms of policy implications, merging, at best, leads to a small reduction in
homelessness and leaves behind people experiencing severe cases of homelessness, i.e.,
chronic homelessness. Migration from neighboring CoCs could only explain 29% of the
increase on chronic homelessness, found by dividing its lower bound by the average effect
of merging in chronic homelessness. The mechanism is then likely a slower rate of placing
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chronically homeless persons into independent housing, more persons experiencing long
or chronic cases of homelessness, or fewer services. Following estimates of the impact of
PSH beds on chronic homelessness in Corinth (2017), one additional bed decreases chronic
homelessness by 0.24 persons. Applied to my results by multiplying the average change in
PSH beds by 0.24 and dividing that by the average change in per-capita chronic homeless,
merging’s decreasing PSH beds would explain about 56% of the increase in chronic
homelessness. As there is no evidence non-chronic homelessness decreased, the remaining
mechanism is then likely a slower rate of placement from PSH into independent housing
(Corinth 2017).
In terms of welfare, Evans et al. (2016) estimate, including private costs to the
homeless person, homelessness to cost society $20,548. Hunter et al. (2017), in evaluating
costs of PSH, found the average homeless person, 83% of whom were chronic and higherusers of health services in the study, to have public service costs of $38,146, largely from
healthcare costs, without housing. As chronic homelessness increased an average of 0.719
per 10,000 population in the CoC after merging, this would be an increase in chronic
homelessness by 619 persons as pre-treatment average population was 8.615 million. This
translates into an increase in costs of about $12.7 and $23.6 million based on the two
estimates. As the average federal CoC award pre-treatment was $8.8 million, this would
be a large increase in costs relative to annual federal funding. Factoring in PSH costs from
Hunter et al. (2017) of $15,288 per person and the average decrease post-merging, would
suggest savings from fewer PSH beds of $25.6 million. If no interjurisdictional effect exists
and there are only these two costs, there is likely some welfare improvement. However,
consolidation’s effect on total homelessness in neighboring CoCs would only need to be
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an increase of over 0.22 persons per 10,000 population, given the pre-treatment average
population of 29 million and using the Evans et al. (2016) cost estimate, for consolidation
to harm welfare.
Implementation issues may also limit the effectiveness of merging as a decrease in
permanent supportive housing beds exists. A short-term decrease in service provision could
have long-term impacts on homelessness within the CoC, which future studies can further
analyze. CoCs may consider planning for costs to prevent lapses in service provision that
may occur during the implementation phase.
Lastly, as merging does increase some operational measures related to
coordination, such as increasing the HMIS participation rate and award per service
provider, while not decreasing specialization of service type, policy related to merging
could focus on turning increased coordination into improving outcomes. While increasing
coordination is an intermediate goal, its ultimate goal is to decrease homelessness and do
so more efficiently.
The findings also suggest the public administration literature must consider how
merging jurisdictions, regardless of coordination, affects outcomes, particularly over time.
As estimates control for how coordination-prone CoCs are through fixed effects and
outcomes still change after merging, studies analyzing interjurisdictional coordination
must consider how incentives affect outcomes. Additionally, studies must consider how
changes in jurisdictions dynamically affect outcomes through short- versus long-run effects
and subpopulations as results differ. CoCs, a unique government district prioritizing
coordination, provide an apt example of how merging in an area affects outcomes given
their inherent nature of coordination and externality costs imposed.
29

Some limitations remain, particularly related to mechanisms connecting merging
to outcomes. More detailed data on individual service providers can reveal variation in the
specialization of services, especially between CoCs that merged and did not. Expanding
the analysis of interjurisdictional effects to other forms, such as metropolitan statistical
areas, can also show how the number of CoCs in a geographic area changes outcomes.
Lastly, more detailed data on the migration of homeless persons across CoCs can better
explain behaviors of persons experiencing homelessness and how different subpopulations
react to changes in services dependent on the number of CoCs.
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2.6

Tables and Figures

Table 2.1 Summary Statistics
Obs.
Operational Variables
Total Homeless Service Beds per Capita*
Permanent Support Housing Beds per
Capita*
Grant Recipients per Capita*
Federal Award per Capita*
Award per Service Provider
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
HMIS Rate for PSH
Homelessness Variables
Total Homeless Persons per Capita*
Unsheltered Homeless Persons per
Capita*
Sheltered Homeless Persons per Capita*
Chronically Homeless Persons per
Capita*
Non-Chronically Homeless Persons per
Capita
Control Variables
Unemployment Rate
Poverty Rate
New Low-Income Housing Tax Credit
Units*
Per Capita Income
Fair Market Rent, 0 Bedrooms
Population Density
Share Black
Share Hispanic
Share Asian
TANF 2-Person Benefit
Governor is a Democrat
Labor Force per Capita*

Mean

S.D.

Min

3,872

20.83

18.91

3,872
3,836
3,836
4,175
4,544
4,514

8.259
0.305
49,631
175.1
0.245
0.757

10.32
0
101.6
0.248 0.0044 2.006
53,336 143.4 469,004
127.5 2.490 1,173
0.0670 0.131
1
0.280
0
1

3,874

19.56

20.85

0.133

202.0

3,874
3,874

7.724
11.83

16.10
10.39

0
0

171.0
117.9

3,874

3.682

6.233

0

106.0

3,874

15.88

16.10

0.088

153.8

3,876
3,876

6.799
14.11

2.787
4.713

2.8
2.2

28.90
39.20

3,876
3,876
3,876
3,876
3,876
3,876
3,876
4,219
4,207
3,876

0

Max
218.5

2.396
3.948
0
61.53
43,534 12,109 12,056 124,552
646.3
206.9 247.5 1,915
0.000415 0.00104
0
0.0146
12.85
12.29
0.2
66.10
11.69
12.72
0.6
83.40
4.498
5.345
0
46.32
714.9
151.9
426
1,259
0.486
0.500
0
1
4,969
542.2 3,708 8,087

Notes: Data are at the CoC level and from 2007-2017. * indicates the rate per 10,000
population. All operational homelessness variables are used as outcomes.
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Total Homeless

Unsheltered

Sheltered

Chronic

Non-Chronic

Post-Merger

0.790

0.968

-0.094

0.719*

0.071

Standard Error

(1.350)

(0.917)

(0.635)

(0.352)

(1.254)

Observations

3,863

3,863

3,863

3,863

3,863

Number of CoCs

359

359

359

359

359

Pre-Treatment Mean

13.98

5.873

8.107

1.866

12.11

Lower Bound Pct of Mean

-13.35%

-14.23%

-17.33%

1.39%

-19.77%

Point Estimate Pct of Mean

5.65%

16.48%

-1.16%

38.53%

0.59%

Upper Bound Pct of Mean

24.64%

47.19%

12.93%

75.67%

20.95%

Notes: Standard errors clustered at the CoC level in parentheses. Control variables per capita income, unemployment rate, new
low-income housing tax credit units, share of the population black, Asian, and Hispanic, population density, poverty rate, 0bedroom fair market rent, if the governor is a Democrat, TANF 2-person benefit, state labor force per capita, and CoC, and year
fixed effects are included in all models. Model is two-way fixed effects with “post-merger” a variable taking the value of one
for a CoC after it merges and zero otherwise. Lower/Upper Bound Pct of Mean are lower and upper bounds of the 95% confidence
interval in units of percent of the pre-treatment mean. Data are for years 2007-2017. CoCs that merged in 2007, 2008, and 20152017 are dropped from the sample to create a balanced sample relative to years from treatment. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Table 2.2 Estimates of Homelessness Measures
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HMIS PSH
Rate

Total Beds

PSH

HHI

Award

Service
Providers

Award per
Provider

Post-Merger

0.135**

-1.347

-1.676**

0.009

-1,577

-0.043***

22.64***

Standard Error

(0.051)

(0.815)

(0.635)

(0.009)

(1,759)

(0.010)

(7.167)

Observations

3,830

3,861

3,861

3,845

3,825

3,825

3,825

Number of CoCs

358

359

359

358

360

359

359

Pre-Treatment Mean

0.574

12.51

4.081

0.234

25,358

0.158

158.9

Lower Bound Pct of Mean

6.10%

-23.59%

-71.67%

-3.85%

-19.86%

-39.24%

5.38%

Point Estimate Pct of
Mean

23.52

-10.77%

-41.07%

3.85%

-6.22%

-27.22%

14.25%

Upper Bound Pct of Mean

40.94%

2.05%

-10.46%

11.54%

7.43%

-15.19%

23.12%

Notes: Standard errors clustered at the CoC level in parentheses. Control variables per capita income, unemployment rate, new
low-income housing tax credit units, the share of the population black, Asian, and Hispanic, population density, poverty rate, 0bedroom fair market rent, if the governor is a Democrat, TANF 2-person benefit, state labor force per capita, and CoC, and year
fixed effects are included in all models. Model is two-way fixed effects with “post-merger” a variable taking the value of one
for a CoC after it merges and zero otherwise. Lower/Upper Bound Pct of Mean are lower and upper bounds of the 95% confidence
interval in units of percent of the pre-treatment mean. Data are for years 2007-2017. CoCs that merged in 2007, 2008, and 20152017 are dropped from the sample to create a balanced sample relative to years from treatment. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, *
p<0.05
Table 2.3 Estimates of Operational Measures

Figure 2.1 Benefits and Challenges Table form HUD’s “CoCs Mergers – What to
Consider?”

Notes: Published 6 February 2018 by Office of Special Needs Assistance Programs.
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Figure 2.2 Continuum of Care Relationship Model

HUD
CoC
ISP

CoC
ISP

ISP

ISP

Notes: Solid lines represent coordination. Dashed arrows represent competition. ISP stands
for Individual Service Provider, CoC for Continuum of Care, and HUD for Department of
Housing and Urban Development.
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Figure 2.3 Time-Varying Generalized Difference-in-Difference – Homelessness Measures
Panel A. Total Homeless

Panel B. Unsheltered

Panel C. Sheltered

Panel D. Chronic

Panel E. Non-Chronic

Notes: Areas in blue show 95% confidence intervals where points are coefficient for each
year from treatment with a base year of -1. Model is event-study design with dummy
variables for each year from treatment taking the value of one for a CoC if it merged and
the observation is j years from treatment and zero otherwise. Control variables per capita
income, unemployment rate, new low-income housing tax credit units, the share of the
population black, Asian, and Hispanic, population density, poverty rate, 0-bedroom fair
market rent, if the governor is a Democrat, TANF 2-person benefit, state labor force per
capita, and CoC, and year fixed effects are included in all models. Treatment occurs in
period 0. Data are for years 2007-2017 CoCs that merged in 2007, 2008, and 2015-2017
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are dropped from the sample to create a balanced sample relative to years from treatment.
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Figure 2.4 Time-Varying Generalized Difference-in-Difference – Operations Measures
Panel A. HMIS PSH Rate
Panel B. Total Beds

Panel C. PSH Beds

Panel D. HHI

Panel E. Award

Panel F. Award per Service Provider

Notes: Areas in blue show 95% confidence intervals where points are coefficient for each
year from treatment with a base year of -1. Model is event-study design with dummy
variables for each year from treatment taking the value of one for a CoC if it merged and
the observation is j years from treatment and zero otherwise. Control variables per capita
income, unemployment rate, new low-income housing tax credit units, the share of the
population black, Asian, and Hispanic, population density, poverty rate, 0-bedroom fair
market rent, if the governor is a Democrat, TANF 2-person benefit, state labor force per
capita, and CoC, and year fixed effects are included in all models. Treatment occurs in
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period 0. Data are for years 2007-2017. CoCs that merged in 2007, 2008, and 2015-2017
are dropped from the sample to create a balanced sample relative to years from treatment.
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CHAPTER 3. HELPING HOMELESS STUDENTS SUCCEED: IMPACTS OF MCKINNEY-VENTO
GRANTS ON THE IDENTIFICATION OF HOMELESS STUDENTS AND STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT
3.1

Introduction
Reported student homelessness has almost doubled over the past decade, from

about 0.8 million students in 2008 to 1.5 million in 2019. The growth in homelessness is a
product of worsening underlying economic conditions faced by many families but may
also reflect school district administrators’ responses to financial incentives to identify a
larger number of students or increased resources. As students experiencing homelessness
tend to have lower test scores and worse educational outcomes, significant resources
through Title I Part A and the McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act (M-V) have been
devoted to removing academic barriers these students face (Cowen, 2017; Darolia and
Sullivan, 2021; Miller, 2011). However, every school district does not receive these funds
– only 31% of districts receive M-V grants – with grants typically going to districts with
higher rates of homelessness. As opposed to only latent homelessness increasing, the
increase in student homelessness may be through the identification of students. The
situation raises two pertinent questions. First, do intergovernmental M-V grants increase
the identification of students experiencing homelessness? Second, do M-V grants lead to
an increase in the share of homeless students proficient on standardized tests, a main
outcome stated for grants (Department of Education, 2016)?
Similar questions have been asked in public finance and policy, most notably the
identification of special education students. Several studies find an increase in funds for
special education students correlates with an increase in the share of students identified as
having special education needs (Kwak, 2010; Morrill, 2018). For example, Cullen (2003)
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finds almost 40% of the increase in special education students could be explained by
financial incentives, using variation in Texas’s funding. While financial incentives exist
for the identification of students experiencing homelessness and administrators have
discretion in identifying students, almost no studies have looked at the impact of these
incentives.
Also stemming from the availability of M-V grants, the increase could be from
better identification of homeless students. The definition of student homelessness is a child
or youth lacking “a fixed, regular, and adequate nighttime residence” (42 U.S.C.
§11434A(2)(A)). Student homelessness includes those in households sharing housing
because of economic hardship or similar reason, about 76% of students experiencing
homelessness, as well as those living on the streets or in homeless shelters (Department of
Education, 2018; Harvey, 2020; Pavlakis, 2018). Resource-constrained district
administrators may have difficulty identifying all students experiencing homelessness as
the reason for doubling-up may be unclear or households have several reasons for
doubling-up (Cunningham et al., 2010; Department of Education, 2016). Receiving a grant
could increase the number of students identified as homeless by providing additional
resources to administrators, meaning the number of students experiencing homelessness
has stayed constant, but administrators better identify students eligible for services.
To better understand how districts respond to intergovernmental grants for
identifying homeless students, I estimate the impact of a school district’s receiving a
federal McKinney-Vento homeless assistance grant on the number of students identified
as homeless and their academic achievement using a school district-level fuzzy regression
discontinuity design and state-level interrupted time series. Most states subgrant M-V
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funds to districts based in part on a district’s number of homeless students, but the actual
threshold and formula is unknown to fund applicant districts. I therefore estimate implicit
homeless student count thresholds in each state and year based on the distribution of
homeless students across districts. For example, in 2018 South Carolina in Figure 3.1, the
x-axis plots each district’s state-by-year percentile its number of homeless students places
it into, where the district with the percentile of 100 has the most students identified as
homeless. Within a bandwidth of five on either side of the 56 th percentile, assignment of
grants follows close to a ranking system of the number of homeless students. At least
visually, many states follow a similar pattern where, within a bandwidth, there is a
discontinuity in the likelihood of receiving a grant, although the discontinuities occur at
different points and are unknown without empirical investigation.
I find that receiving a grant did not increase the share of students identified as
homeless, meaning identification likely did not cause the increase in homelessness; the
increase instead likely represents a true increase in housing insecurity for children and
youth. I do so by estimating state-by-year discontinuities in the probability of receiving a
M-V grant based on districts’ percentiles of homeless students. The discontinuity is then
used in a fuzzy regression discontinuity design to plausibly identify the effect of receiving
a grant on the identification of homeless students and their test scores, comparing variation
in outcomes for districts just above and below the thresholds. Additionally, I find a
district’s receiving a grant decreased the share of homeless students scoring proficient on
state math tests by about 17%. A decrease in revenue from city and county governments
may explain the lack of a change in identification and the decrease in achievement.
***Insert Figure 3.1***
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To further explore if identification increases from amplified funds, I analyze the
effect of increased funding availability through the American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act (ARRA), using an interrupted time series at the state level from 2005-2017. ARRA
doubled the funding available for districts to serve their students experiencing
homelessness for one year in 2010, shown in Table 3.1. Additional funding could allow
districts to more accurately identify and serve students while simultaneously incentivizing
districts to report more homelessness to receive funds. While the number of identified
doubled-up students increased after ARRA, it follows the same trend as before ARRA with
no discontinuity in 2010, suggesting identification did not cause the increase.
***Insert Table 3.1***
I present some of the first evidence that the large increase in student homelessness
is likely not driven by identification, either from increased resources or financial
incentives. Unlike the identification of special education students, the increase is instead
likely driven by economic factors related to homelessness, such as less affordable housing.
This may result from funds being less than those for special education. I further show that
estimating implicit thresholds can be used to provide causal evidence for policy questions,
particularly when there is an implied ranking or treatment begins to happen after a certain
point in a given bandwidth (Brunner et al., 2019; McEachin et al., 2020; Porter and Yu,
2015). Estimating implicit thresholds in a fuzzy regression discontinuity design can then
provide strong evidence for the effectiveness of policies.
3.2

Education for Homeless Children and Youths Grants for State and Local Activities
The U.S. Department of Education (ED) annually gives state education agencies

McKinney-Vento (M-V) homeless assistance funds to sub-grant to school districts, with
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the goal of removing academic barriers students experiencing homelessness face. States
have discretion in how many districts to subgrant to and how many funds will go to a given
district, so long as at least 75% of the state’s funds are distributed to school districts. ED
only requires states to consider need and quality of applications on a competitive basis
(Department of Education, 2016). Figure 3.2 shows school districts ranked from least
homeless students to most within each state and year. Dots are the share of districts
receiving a grant for each 0.5 percentile of state-by-year homelessness. A district’s
probability of receiving an M-V grant positively correlates with its state-by-year percentile
of homelessness. For example, only 30% of districts at the median within a state and year
receive a grant, 40% of districts at the 80th percentile, and about 50% for the districts with
the most. There is consequently variation in the distribution of funds, particularly across
states, although need positively relates with the likelihood of receiving a grant.
***Insert Figure 3.2***
Allowing states to decide where to distribute grants and giving receiving districts
discretion in the use of grants can balance keeping local control of grants’ specific uses
while increasing equity and directing resources to places with more need (Musgrave, 1959;
Oates, 1972, 1999; Cascio et al., 2013). Students experiencing homelessness have
heterogenous needs and contexts, facing different barriers to educational achievement,
meaning services may take different forms. Pavalkis (2018) describes several housing
insecure situations, such as a student in a homeless shelter’s main educational barrier as
lacking basic necessities like food and safety whereas a student living doubled up may have
the challenge of stressed intra-household relationships and transportation to school and
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services. Decentralized grant distribution lets districts choose services to best help their
students’ particular needs.
Every school district has a homeless liaison to identify and aid students
experiencing homelessness, regardless of whether the district receives an M-V grant. Past
studies suggest liaisons have severely limited resources and discrepancies exist across
districts in their capacity to identify students (Cunningham et al., 2010; JozefowiczSimbeni and Israel, 2006). Homelessness includes students doubled up as well as those
living in hotels/motels, a homeless shelter, or are unsheltered. Identification of students
doubling up can be particularly malleable as each liaison determines whether economic
hardship or loss of housing determined the living situation. Additionally, identifying
students who live doubled up generally involves awareness campaigns, student housing
questionnaires, and referral forms, leaving much of identification out of the liaisons’ and
instead in families’ control (Cunningham et al., 2010).
Being identified may remove some academic barriers through services faced by
students experiencing homelessness. Barriers include stressors such as increased
residential mobility, trauma, unstable and unsafe living environments, and increased health
issues (Cowen, 2017). Districts must provide identified students with several services,
including transportation and expedited enrollment without proof of residency until
determination of homelessness is settled. Identified students, particularly in districts
receiving M-V grants, often receive other services: tutoring, medical referrals and other
educational services that help homeless children and youth reach state standards
(Department of Education, 2016).
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Additional resources from receiving an M-V grant could allow districts to more
accurately identify and serve students by increasing the quality and quantity of reach-out
efforts to identify students, the first step in connecting students experiencing homelessness
with services. In practice, resources for identification could be more outreach materials,
professional development for liaisons and teachers, hiring a social worker for students, or
events connecting the community and housing services to district officials. Ideally, these
increased efforts would connect students experiencing homelessness to school resources,
leading to increased enrollment, attendance, and academic outcomes (Cunningham et al.,
2010).
The potential for receiving a grant could also increase identification by
incentivizing district administrators to be more lenient in determining whether a given
student fits the federal definition and guidelines of homelessness when their status is
ambiguous. Being more lenient in identification would increase the perceived need and the
thus likelihood of receiving an M-V grant in the future. Administrators could also have a
tendency to consider a student whose housing status is unclear as homeless to ensure every
student possibly homeless is identified and receives services. However, as identifying a
student as homeless comes with essentially unfunded mandates, such as providing
transportation, there could be a financial disincentive. Grants would partially offset the
disincentive for identification but are small. For example, only $85 were provided through
M-V grants per homeless student in districts receiving grants in the 2017-18 school year.
The relationship between financial incentives and number of students identified is thus
ambiguous without further empirical study.

46

3.3

Empirical Approach
3.3.1

Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity

I estimate the effect of receiving a M-V grant on the identification of students
experiencing homelessness and the share of homeless students scoring proficient on tests
using a fuzzy regression discontinuity (FRD) design (Imbens and Lemeiux, 2008). Since
grants on average go to districts with more students experiencing homelessness or
achieving the goal of higher test scores, using an FRD can create a quasi-experimental
setting to control for these confounding factors as districts just above and below the
threshold would be similar but for the increased probability of receiving a grant. As the
cutoff for awarding grants to districts is unknown without empirical investigation, I
estimate state-by-year thresholds to then compare districts just below and above the cutoff
to estimate the impact, as being awarded a grant would be like-random near the threshold.
Little room for manipulation by districts exists as the threshold is unknown and informal. 12
Porter and Yu (2015) propose a method to find an unknown discontinuity by estimating
where along a running variable the discontinuity is the largest and using that point as the
group-by-time threshold. A regression discontinuity is then used to estimate treatment
effects within a bandwidth around the estimated point. This method has been used in recent
policy literature in the FRD framework, notably Brunner et al. (2019) and McEachin et al.
(2020), whose methods I broadly follow.
Many states prioritize need in distributing grants by using the number of students
identified as homeless in the districts. As states then conceivably distribute funds based on

12

Visual tests of manipulation strongly suggest none is present as the distribution within the bandwidths
follow a uniform distribution, shown in Figure 3.4.
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an implicit ranking by need, it follows that the number of students identified as homeless
would positively influence the likelihood of a district’s receiving a grant and that, within a
state and year, an unknown rank in the number of homeless students would cause a
discontinuity within a bandwidth. The percentile is the district’s state-by-year percentile of
homeless students where a percentile of 100 has the most homeless students. As the number
of homeless students may be endogenous to receiving a grant the prior year, the outcome
is receiving a grant the following year.
I first estimate, shown in Equation (1), state-by-year linear probability models for
the probability of receiving a grant (𝑇𝑑𝑠𝑦 ) for each state s in year y for district d.13 I do this
around bandwidths (BW) of 5 percentiles for each whole-number percentile 5 through 95,
referred to as 𝜔𝑠𝑦 .14,15
𝑇𝑑𝑠𝑦 = 𝛼𝑖𝑠𝑦 𝑑(𝜔𝑠𝑦 < 𝑋𝑑𝑠𝑦−1 ) + 𝜃11 (𝑋𝑑𝑠𝑦−1 − 𝜔𝑠𝑦 ) + 𝜃12 (𝑋𝑑𝑠𝑦−1 −

(1)

𝜔𝑠𝑦 )𝑑(𝜔𝑠𝑦 < 𝑋𝑑𝑠𝑦−1 ) + 𝜀1𝑑𝑠𝑦
where the sample is 𝑋𝑑𝑠𝑦 ∈ [𝜔𝑠𝑦 ± 𝐵𝑊]. The threshold is chosen based on the value of
𝑋𝑑𝑠𝑦−1 when 𝛼̃𝑖𝑠𝑦 > 𝛼𝑗𝑠𝑦 where j is all possible thresholds besides i. 𝛼̃𝑖𝑠𝑦 is then the most
positive coefficient for that state and year, meaning, for districts within the bandwidth,
being above that percentile has the largest discontinuous increase in the probability of
receiving a grant for that state and year.

13

Appendix B Figure B1 shows the distribution of estimated thresholds.
As sensitivity checks, I also use a bandwidth of 10 and use a quadratic model.
15 At least two districts must be on either side of the threshold within the bandwidth. 14 states had too few
districts or too little variation in percentiles and were thus dropped from estimation: Alaska, Colorado,
Delaware, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Louisiana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Puerto
Rico, Rhode Island, South Dakota, and Vermont. Only Hawaii, Oklahoma, Puerto Rico, and Vermont are
dropped in estimations using a bandwidth of 10.
14
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𝑑(𝜔𝑠𝑦 < 𝑋𝑑𝑠𝑦−1 ) is an indicator variable taking a value of one if the district’s
percentile is more than the threshold, meaning it had more homelessness than districts
below 𝜔𝑠𝑦 . (𝑋𝑑𝑠𝑦−1 − 𝜔𝑠𝑦 ) is how many percentiles away the district is from the threshold,
with 𝜃11 being the relationship between the distance and receiving a grant. 𝜃12 is the change
in the probability of receiving a grant based on having more homelessness than the
threshold and percentiles away. Including these terms allows for different functions on
either side of the threshold. 𝜀1𝑑𝑠𝑦 are robust standard errors. 𝛼𝑖𝑠𝑦 is the coefficient of
interest as the percentile maximizing the discontinuity in a given state and year, 𝜔
̂𝑠𝑦 , will
be the implicit threshold. Percentiles across districts are then centered by 𝑋̃𝑑𝑠𝑦 = 𝑋𝑑𝑠𝑦 −
𝜔
̂𝑠𝑦 , meaning a district with a positive 𝑋̃𝑑𝑠𝑦 is above the discontinuity and has a higher
probability of receiving a grant.
As the discontinuity is not sharp, meaning some districts above the threshold do not
receive grants and vice versa, I use an FRD through a two-stage least squares (2SLS) where
Equation (2) is the first stage predicting receiving a M-V sub-grant:
(2)

𝐺𝑑𝑠𝑦 =

𝛼̃𝑑(0 < 𝑋̃𝑑𝑠𝑦 ) + 𝜃21 𝑋̃𝑑𝑠𝑦 + 𝜃22 𝑋̃𝑑𝑠𝑦 𝑑(0 < 𝑋̃𝑑𝑠𝑦 ) + 𝜋2𝑠 + 𝜏2𝑦 + 𝛿2𝑠𝑦 + 𝜆2𝑑𝑦 + 𝜀2𝑑𝑠𝑦
If 0 < 𝑋̃𝑑𝑠𝑦 , then the district’s percentile is above the state-by-year threshold,
meaning its probability of receiving a grant increases by 𝛼̃, the sample average of being
above the threshold. 𝛿2𝑠𝑦 are state-by-year fixed effects, controlling for any characteristic
common to all districts within that state and year, such as total funding or state policy. 𝜋2𝑠
are state-level fixed effects, controlling for anything unobserved common to all districts in
a state over the years, such as political ideology. 𝜏2𝑦 are year fixed effects, controlling for
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anything common to all districts in a given year, such as the national economy. 𝜆2𝑑𝑦 are
observable district-level control variables. Although in theory districts just above and
below the discontinuity should be similar, I add control variables as some other
characteristics, such as being an urban district, could bias results by being related with
receiving a grant and the outcome. I include whether the district is urban, suburban, or town
relative to being rural, enrollment, share of students identifying as Black/African American
or Hispanic, and estimated share of youth in the district living in poverty. Last, 𝜀2𝑑𝑠𝑦 are
standard errors clustered at the district level. 16
The probability of receiving an M-V grant then goes into the second stage, Equation
(3):
(3)

𝑌𝑑𝑠𝑦 = 𝛽𝐺̂𝑑𝑠𝑦 + 𝜃31 𝑋̃𝑑𝑠𝑦 + 𝜃32 𝑋̃𝑑𝑠𝑦 𝑑(0 < 𝑋̃𝑑𝑠𝑦 ) + 𝜋2𝑠 + 𝜏2𝑦 + 𝛿3𝑠𝑦 + 𝜆3𝑑𝑦 +
𝜀3𝑑𝑠𝑦

β is the ultimate parameter of interest as it is the effect of being just above the threshold for
receiving an M-V grant on the outcome. Additionally, the local average treatment effect is
districts just above the threshold compared to those just below as opposed to the general
effect of receiving a grant. The effect is then more applicable to the marginal district
receiving a grant than in general.
3.3.2

Jump Process and American Recovery and Reconciliation Act (ARRA)

To further study how intergovernmental grants affect the identification of students
experiencing homelessness, I study changes in the number of students identified as

16

For robustness and as districts are assigned with states and years, I re-estimate models first clustering by
state and then by state and year, finding similar results.
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homelessness after ARRA, estimating a time series jump process at the state level, shown
in Equation (4). 𝛾𝑦 are indicators for each year, controlling for any characteristic in a given
year common to all states. The omitted year is 2009, the year before ARRA M-V funding
takes effect. 𝛽1,𝑦 is an intercept change related to being in a given year, relative to 2009.
𝛽1,2010 is of particular interest as it is the year states received the additional funding. 𝑋𝑠𝑦
are observable, time-varying state characteristics to control for other possible sources of
changes in the identification of homeless students. 𝜋𝑠 are state fixed effects, controlling for
time-invariant characteristics of states such as political ideology. 𝜀𝑠𝑦 are robust standard
errors clustered at the state level as errors are likely correlated over time within states.
(4)

𝑦=2008

𝑦=2017

𝑌𝑠𝑦 = ∑𝑦=2007 𝛽1,𝑦 ∗ 𝛾𝑦 + ∑𝑦=2010 𝛽1,𝑦 ∗ 𝛾𝑦 + 𝜃𝑋𝑠,𝑦 + 𝜋𝑠 + 𝜀𝑠,𝑦

Although every state received additional funding, each conceivably had three
choices: only provide districts already receiving funding more revenue, increase the
number of districts receiving a grant, or a combination of the two. A state that increased
the number of districts receiving grants could experience alternative outcomes as more
districts could have additional resources to identify students. Additionally, it could also
signal to districts that funds are available for districts in need, increasing leniency in
identification. As shown in Figure 3.3, the share of districts receiving a grant increased
sharply after 2009, meaning a change in funding led to changes in how many districts
received grants. To exploit the difference in reactions to increased funding, I create an
indicator, 𝜗𝑠𝑦 , shown in Equation (5), for if a state increased the share of districts receiving
a grant by at least ten percentage points in 2010, of which 17 states did so. I then interact
this indicator with each year indicator. Each 𝛽2,𝑦 is the relationship with being in that year
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relative to 2009 and states not the share of districts receiving a grant within the state. States
increasing the share of districts between zero and ten percentage points are dropped from
the sample (22 states).
𝑦=2008
𝑦=2017
𝑦=2008
𝑌𝑠𝑦 = ∑𝑦=2007 𝛽2,𝑦 ∗ 𝛾𝑦 ∗ 𝜗𝑠𝑦 + ∑𝑦=2010 𝛽2,𝑦 ∗ 𝛾𝑦 ∗ 𝜗𝑠,𝑦 + ∑𝑦=2007 𝛽3,𝑦 ∗ 𝛾𝑦 +

(5)

∑𝑦=2017
𝑦=2010 𝛽3,𝑦 ∗ 𝛾𝑦 + 𝜃𝑋𝑠,𝑦 + 𝜋𝑠 + 𝜀𝑠,𝑦

***Insert Figure 3.3 Here***
3.4

Data
3.4.1

Outcomes

My first outcome for the FRD analysis is the share of enrolled public-school
students

identified

as

homeless

by

primary

residence

(doubled

up/hotel/sheltered/unsheltered). This provides a measure of homelessness and if incentives
for more students increase the share of students identified. Of interest is potential
differences between effects on doubled-up students and sheltered students as homeless
liaisons have more discretion in identifying students doubling up as they must determine
the reason for the living situation as opposed to only context. My second outcome is the
share of homeless students taking state standardized math and reading/English language
arts (ELA) tests scoring as proficient as this is a stated goal of the grants and a measure of
their effectiveness in removing academic barriers.17 As effects may differ depending on
age or grade, I use the overall share as well as splits for third grade and high school test
takers.

17

The share of homeless students scoring proficient is often provided as a range for districts due to privacy
concerns. Models shown use the midpoint of this range, although I re-estimate models using the lower
bound and upper bound of the range as well as interval estimation, finding similar results in all.
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3.4.2

Sources

First, district-level homelessness data come from ED’s EDFacts data files.18 These
cover all districts in the country annually from the 2013-14 school year through 2017-18
and provide information on if the district received an M-V sub-grant and the number of
students identified homeless by residence. The number of homeless students is
unduplicated within district, but if a student moves districts within a school year and is still
identified as homeless in the new district they could be duplicated. The data thus likely
over-count the number of identified homeless students on a state and national level.
Data on assessments also come from EDFacts and data on enrollment from
Common Core of Data. While homelessness and test proficiency are available for the 201318 school years. The estimated share of students in poverty come from the U.S. Census
Bureau Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates (SAIPE). These data are collected
through Urban Institute’s Education Data Portal. 19 Last, data for state-level analysis come
from Section 1.9 of Consolidated State Performance Reports through No Child Left
Behind. I collect reports from ED’s EDFacts Initiative webpage.20 Data on control
variables for states come from the University of Kentucky Center for Poverty Research and
include AFDC/TANF recipients per capita, state EITC rate, gross state product per capita,
unemployment rate, the number of persons food insecure per capita, poverty rate, if the
state has a Democratic governor, fraction of state House controlled by the Democratic

18

Data are from file specifications C118 and C170.
Education Data Portal (Version 0.6.0), Urban Institute, Center on Education Data and Policy, accessed
March, 11, 2020, https://educationdata.urban.org/documentation/, US Department of Education Common
Core of Data, the US Department of Education Civil Rights Data Collection, the US Census Bureau Small
Area Income and Poverty Estimates, and the US Department of Education EDFacts Initiative.
20 https://www2.ed.gov/about/inits/ed/edfacts/index.html
19
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party, and fraction of state Senate controlled by the Democratic party. 21 I also include
share of the population identifying as white and number of eviction filings from The
Eviction Lab data.22
3.5

Results
3.5.1

Descriptive Statistics

Table 3.2 shows summary statistics for all district-level variables for both the full
sample as well as the analytical sample for the FRD at a bandwidth of 5 percentiles. On
average, 3% of a district’s students experience any type of homelessness in a given year,
while about 2% experience being doubled-up and 0.4% shelter stays. Only 32% of
homeless students score proficient on math and 37% on ELA. The analytical sample is
slightly over-representative of districts receiving M-V grants and with higher rates of
homelessness, although this is expected as resources follow need.
Figure 3.4 shows that manipulation does not occur around estimated thresholds,
with an almost uniform distribution. If there were manipulation around the threshold, one
would see a drop in density just below the threshold and a sudden increase in districts just
above the threshold. Table 3.3 shows summary statistics for control variables by being
above or below the estimated threshold for a bandwidth of 5 percentiles. Most
characteristics are similar, although those above the threshold were more likely to be urban
as opposed to rural and had higher enrollment. Figure B1 shows the distribution of

21

University of Kentucky Center for Poverty Research. (2019, Dec.). UKCPR National Welfare Data,
1980-2018. Lexington, KY. Available at http://ukcpr.org/resources/national-welfare-data.
22 Eviction filings are from The Eviction Lab at Princeton University, a project directed by Matthew
Desmond and designed by Ashley Gromis, Lavar Edmonds, James Hendrickson, Katie Krywokulski,
Lillian Leung, and Adam Porton. The Eviction Lab is funded by the JPB, Gates, and Ford Foundations as
well as the Chan Zuckerberg Initiative. More information is found at evictionlab.org.
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estimated thresholds. Most thresholds are above the 65th percentile, with a high
concentration at the upper limit, consistent with states prioritizing need and beginning subgrants after a certain point of homelessness.
Figure 3.5 shows results from the first stage of the FRD where control variables are
also included. Each marker represents the average share of districts in that bin of 0.20
percentiles receiving a McKinney-Vento Grant. The x-axis shows districts’ percentiles
away from the estimated threshold, the dashed, vertical line. Being just above the threshold
is related with about a 43 percentage point increase in the probability of receiving a grant.
The Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic also averages at 284 in models for homelessness
or overall test proficiency outcomes, providing evidence for a strong first stage. 23 The
following FRD result figures follow a similar format to Figure 3.5, with the p-value for the
discontinuity also below each panel. All models for figures include observable, timevarying control variables, as well as state, year, and state-by-year fixed effects.
***Insert Figures 3.4 and 3.5***
3.5.2

Identification of Students Experiencing Homelessness

In Figure 3.6, receiving a grant likely does not affect rates of students identified as
living in a homeless shelter and those living doubled-up.24 A discontinuity in
homelessness does not seem to exist visually for doubled-up homelessness, suggesting
statistical insignificance is not solely from wide standard errors but from no true effect.
Although the number of students identified as living doubled up increases as the district’s
state-by-year percentile increases, there is no discontinuity at the threshold, suggesting
23

Table A6 shows first stage results across other specifications.
24 All results are available in table format in Appendix A.
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receiving a grant does not lead to increased identification, either from increased leniency
or better identification. The result for sheltered homelessness is less clear as there is a small
visual discontinuity. The estimated coefficient is also 0.13, which is about 24% of the mean
for the analytical sample, which would be a sizeable effect if statistically significant. 25
***Insert Figure 3.6***
3.5.3

Academic Proficiency

In Figure 3.7, receiving a grant seems to decrease the share of homeless students
testing proficient on math by about five percentage points (17% of the mean for the
analytical sample). While the share of homeless students proficient on math increases up
to the discontinuity, there is a sudden drop at the discontinuity with a flatter slope. Reading
proficiency does not have a similar discontinuity or has a negligible effect at most. To see
if the result applies to different ages of students experiencing homelessness, I next split
proficiency by grade. While statistically insignificant, Figure 3.8 visually suggests the
decrease in proficiency may come from earlier grades as opposed to later.26 The estimated
coefficient for 3rd grade math proficiency is a decrease at the continuity by about four
percentage points, or 11% of the mean. High school proficiency, on the other hand, has no
discontinuity, suggesting no effect of the grants.
***Insert Figures 3.7, 3.8, and 3.9***

25 As this could also suggest an unobserved determinant of increased likelihood in receiving a grant by
having more severe homelessness, I re-estimate all models controlling for share of homeless students that
are sheltered, finding results to be similar.
26 Figure 9 shows results for reading proficiency by grade, with no effect.
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3.5.4

Exploring Mechanisms: Alternative Revenues and Behavior

Several mechanisms could lead to no change in identification and a decrease in
proficiency. First, support for students experiencing homelessness may try to help students
in ways that do not translate into increased identification or improved proficiency on state
standardized tests. Second, a decrease of other resources may mean grants do not lead to
more resources as intended. Last, following social isolation theory, a district’s receiving a
grant and providing services for homeless students may stigmatize them, leading to
negative psychological effects which decrease their likelihood of scoring proficient (Aviles
de Bradley, 2011).
Exploring the theory of decreased alternative revenue sources, school districts,
local governments, and states may respond to receiving grants by decreasing funding
through substituting away from other revenue sources. While on one hand, receiving an
M-V grant could signal need in a district, amplifying funding to it and any positive effects
of more resources (Hines and Thaler, 1995; Cascio et al., 2013). Increased
intergovernmental revenue would further incentivize actions increasing the likelihood of
receiving a grant. Alternatively, receiving an M-V grant may decrease other sources of
funding (Gordon, 2004). A decrease in these other revenues would neutralize positive
revenue from the grant and associated increases in capacity to identify students along with
incentives to receive a grant. For example, the local government may provide fewer
resources to a receiving district as the homeless students already receive revenue from the
state to support their education.
I use several financial indicators to test the theory of financial effects. First, I use
revenue from the local city and county governments as receiving a new grant to help
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homeless students within the local boundary could decrease revenue from local
governments as they would directly serve these students. Second, as previous literature has
found Title I funding to crowd-out state funding, I see the effect on Title I revenue per
student. Last, as receiving a grant may change districts’ expenditures, I use spending per
student on transportation and student support services as these most relate to services for
students experiencing homelessness. These data come from the Common Core of Data and
are for 2013-2017.
Figure 3.10 provides some evidence toward the alternative revenues theory. Panel
A suggests a district that receives a grant obtains half the revenue per student from local
city and county governments. Revenue from the city/county government per student
steeply increases up to the threshold to about $400 per student, then drastically decreases
to between $100 and $200 per student. Panel B on the other hand shows grants do not
decrease Title I revenue as there is no discontinuity at the threshold, although there is wide
variation. Some evidence therefore exists that M-V grants decrease other sources of
revenue. A decrease in alternative revenues means there may be no net financial gain or
incentive, possibly explaining some of the lack of a change in identification and decrease
in proficiency of homeless students. Additionally, Figure 3.11 suggests no changes in
spending on student support services or transportation per student.
***Insert Figures 3.10 and 3.11***
Receiving an M-V grant could also impact behavior or discipline in a district.
Experiencing homelessness often carries stigma for students, which a district’s receiving a
grant could exacerbate by drawing attention to these students (Aviles de Bradley, 2011;
Miller, 2011). Bullying could then increase from this increased attention. Alternatively,
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homeless students could be subject to more disciplinary actions due to stressors at home
spilling over into school. I therefore estimate the effect on the number of harassment
allegations related to race or disability per 1,000 students in a district, using data from the
Civil Rights Data Collection. While not directly related to homelessness, race intersects
with homelessness, changing how schools support students (Aviles de Bradley, 2015). As
worse behavior can lead to more disciplinary actions, I include both in-school suspensions
and out-of-school suspensions per 1,000 students. CRDC data only overlaps with
homelessness data for 2016.
Figures 3.12 and 3.13 suggest receiving a grant does not change harassment allegations
or suspensions per 1,000 students in a district. Although the statistical insignificance could
be from a smaller sample size from only having one year, there is no indication a
discontinuity exists. Based on the coefficients, the largest changes would be an increase in
race allegations by 10% and in school suspensions by about 16% from the mean, although
these estimates are very imprecise with large standard errors. Grants could still increase
harassment but at a level smaller than a district, such as a classroom. Additionally, stigma
could also still increase for homeless students that is unrelated to harassment or discipline
but spills over into identification and academic achievement.
***Insert Figures 3.12 and 3.13***
3.5.5

Jump Process Results

Figure 3.14 shows the results of the jump process around ARRA. Each marker
shows the coefficient from that year’s indicator with a base year of 2009, with shaded areas
showing the 95% confidence intervals. Each coefficient is then the average difference in
homelessness across states, after controlling for states’ fixed and time-varying
59

characteristics, relative to 2009. Sheltered homelessness initially fell in 2010 and has
steadily risen since. The number of students living doubled up increased after ARRA,
shown in Panel B. However, ARRA likely did not cause the increase as doubled-up
homelessness was already increasing and there was not a jump in 2010.
***Insert Figure 3.14***
In Figure 3.15, markers are coefficients showing the difference in the number of
students identified as homeless relative to 2009 and states not increasing their share of
districts receiving a grant. Sheltered homelessness has an inverse-U shape, initially
decreasing in 2010 and then increasing until 2013 when it began decreasing again.
Doubled-up homelessness instead increased after ARRA and stayed relatively constant.
While it increased in 2010 on average, it peaked in 2011, which is also individually
statistically significant. Additionally, there is no evidence of pre-trends in Figure 3.15. This
suggests states increasing the share of districts receiving an M-V grant by more than ten
percentage points to have had more students identified as living doubled up in 2011 relative
to 2009 and compared to those that did not increase the percent of districts receiving a
grant. It would also be an increase of 32% from the pre-2010 mean. However, using the
point estimate, sheltered homelessness per student is also 18% higher than its pre-2010
mean. Therefore, there is limited evidence states which increased the share of districts
receiving a grant also had an increase in homelessness due to identification.
***Insert Figure 3.15***
3.5.6

Sensitivity Checks

To test the sensitivity of results, I conduct several sensitivity checks, results from
which are shown in Appendix A. First, I increase the bandwidths to 10 to test sensitivity to
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bandwidth. Second, I re-estimate models using quadratic distance terms instead of linear.
I also estimate models without controls as they are theoretically not needed if results are
like-random in actuality. Results from these specifications are generally similar in
statistical significance and magnitude. Table B1 also shows results from non-instrumental
variable models, using an indicator for whether the district received an M-V grant, as well
as control variables and state, year, and state-by-year fixed effects. Last, I also estimate
models using proficiency on tests for all students in a district, finding no effect, providing
further evidence the mechanism for the decrease in homeless students’ proficiency is
related to homeless students, not the district at large.
3.6

Discussion
While the number of students identified as homeless has drastically risen since

2007, it has remained ambiguous whether the increase has occurred from identification or
an increase in housing insecurity. As financial incentives have been shown in related
literature to affect measurement, such as the identification of special education students, it
could have been the increase occurred from incentives to receive grants instead of
economic reasons. If this were the case, policies would perhaps change to eliminate the
incentive and not focus on housing insecurity. Alternatively, grants could increase the
identification of students by providing additional resources. The increase would then be in
identified homeless students as opposed to an increase in the true number of students
experiencing homelessness.
However, I present some of the first evidence that the increase in student
homelessness is not from identification, which has two main policy implications. First, past
61

literature on financial incentives’ increasing the identification of students with a given
condition, such as eligible for special education, may not apply to students experiencing
homelessness or similar situations. One reason this could occur is a low financial incentive
as relates to serving homeless students relative to other student support services. For
example, only $85 million was provided in M-V grants in the 2017-18 school year. This
translates into about $21,500 per district receiving a grant or $85 per student identified as
homeless in districts receiving grants. As district must provide services for students
identified as homeless, such as transportation, even receiving a grant may not be enough
to cover the costs of providing each student the required services. Further, if there a
decrease in alternative revenues from receiving a grant, such as revenue from city and
county governments, then there could even be a financial disincentive to identify homeless
students.
Second, as the increase in the share of students experiencing homelessness,
particularly students living doubled up, is likely not identification, it is likely housing
insecurity has become worse for children and youth over the 2010s. Being doubled up can
be a strong signal of a future problem of severe cases of homelessness, such as those living
on streets or in shelters (O’Flaherty, 2019). As doubling-up is also a result of extreme
poverty as relates to housing costs, it also suggests more support will be needed to students
experiencing poverty, as well as housing instability or mobility in general (Cowen, 2017).
Policymakers may use this finding as a signal of the problem and design solutions to
prevent the problem before it worsens. Additionally, as homelessness and mobility likely
decrease educational outcomes for students, increasing housing stability could indirectly
increase educational outcomes (Pavlakis, 2018).
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Despite being a goal of the M-V grants, I do not find grants to increase proficiency
on state standardized tests for homeless students. This could be from several mechanisms.
First, as described in the last section, M-V grants do not provide a large amount of
additional funding for districts, meaning the resources may be exhausted after providing
required services with none left for educational services like tutoring. Substitution away
from other revenues could be an unintended effect that thwarts the goal. Second, being
identified as homeless could increase stigma from classmates or even teachers (Cowen,
2017). While I provide a limited analysis using CRDC data, a student-level analysis can
provide greater inference as to how the stigma of homelessness affects education above
housing insecurity. Last, it may be grants direct services to other areas of a student’s life
than purely education, such as making sure they have additional socio-emotional support,
counseling, or material necessities. In the long-term, this may improve test scores for a
student who experienced homelessness; my analysis only looked at proficiency for students
who were homeless during the year which they were tested. A greater understanding of the
dynamics of student homelessness, its long-term effects, and impact of services can provide
inference as to the mechanism by which grants decrease the share of homeless students
proficient on tests (Darolia and Sullivan, 2021).
Apart from literature on housing insecurity and education, this study also
contributes to the greater discussion in public economics and finance of how financial
incentives influence actions of government actors. While several previous studies find
financial incentives play a large role in the identification of a perceived problem, I suggest
this to not always be the case for programs. The difference could result from fewer financial
incentives, homelessness’s being a relatively rare condition with less than 3% of students
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experiencing in a year, or some other factor. Future work can explore other contexts
through which financial incentives may be unrelated to identification. I also contribute the
literature on using implicit thresholds in a regression discontinuity framework to provide
causal evidence. Prior work typically used implicit thresholds in a context where there is a
clear threshold, but it is unknown, such as test scores to be placed into a program (Brunner
et al., 2019; McEachin et al., 2020). I build from this literature to extend it to a context
where a discontinuity may not exist. However, I show the methods can be used even when
there is only an implied ranking where treatment also occurs after a certain point within a
bandwidth, such as states’ prioritizing giving grants to school districts with worse
homelessness. Future studies can look for additional areas where this method can be
applied to increase the knowledge about the effectiveness of policies.
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3.7

Tables and Figures

Table 3.1 Total McKinney-Vento Funding by Year
Fiscal Year
Grants
2006
$61,871,040
2007
$61,871,040
2008
$64,066,851
ARRA
$70,000,000
2009
$65,427,000
2010
$65,427,000
2011
$65,296,146
2012
$65,172,591
2013
$61,771,052
2014
$65,042,000
2015
$65,042,000
2016
$70,000,000
2017

$77,000,000

2018

$85,000,000

2019

$93,500,000

Notes: Source is U.S. Department of Education, Education for Homeless Children and
Youths Grants for State and Local Activities Funding Status page.
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MV Grant Recipient
Share Homeless
Share Doubled Up
Share Sheltered
% Homeless Proficient on Math
% Homeless Proficient on Math
(3rd Grade)
% Homeless Proficient on Math
(High School)
% Homeless Proficient on Reading
% Homeless Proficient on Read
(3rd Grade)
% Homeless Proficient on Read
(High School)
Revenue from City/County
Government per student
Title I per student
Transportation Exp. per student
Student Support Exp. per student
ISS per 1,000 students
OSS per 1,000 students
Allegations (Disability) per 1,000
students
Allegations (Race) per 1,000
students
Share in Poverty
City/Urban Locale
Suburban Locale
Town Locale
Share Enrollment Black
Share Enrollment Hispanic

N
61,632
60,994
61,015
61,007
29,809

Full Sample
Mean
0.308
3.103
2.123
0.380
31.68

N
4,220
4,217
4,218
4,218
2,885

Analytical Sample
Mean
0.415
4.278
2.989
0.535
29.60

SD
0.461
5.189
4.033
1.486
19.85

SD
0.493
4.145
3.570
1.488
18.28

10,964

36.48

21.08

1,354

35.28

20.16

8,331
29,930

33.69
36.52

22.44
20.59

1,002
2,886

33.75
33.92

22.89
18.47

10,904

35.91

21.49

1,355

33.71

19.96

8,616

41.70

23.08

1,038

41.26

23.00

35,172
35,177
35,176
35,177
12,080
12,080

331.0
308.7
5,664
682.0
55.86
58.05

2,290
1,212
60,037
7,951
67.90
87.21

1,966
1,966
1,966
1,966
1,035
1,035

188.9
336.4
4,731
558.0
61.85
61.07

822.4
615.4
5,243
643.6
62.65
75.46

12,065

0.512

14.21

1,032

0.281

1.369

12,065
51,438
47,602
47,602
47,602
61,091
61,091

1.048
18.33
0.0775
0.263
0.210
11.39
15.44

14.74
9.687
0.267
0.440
0.407
21.39
20.92

1,032
3,448
3,365
3,365
3,365
4,218
4,218

0.996
19.47
0.126
0.269
0.231
13.66
17.97

4.850
9.288
0.332
0.444
0.421
22.15
21.65

Enrollment (1,000s)
61,187
3.919
12.97
4,218
5.273
12.83
Notes: Analytic sample includes observations where percentile of doubled-up students is within 5 percentiles of estimated
threshold. Observations are school district by year.
Table 3.2 Summary Statistics
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Table 3.3 Summary Statistics by Threshold
Below Threshold
N
Mean
1,726
19.2
1,686
9.7
1,686
27.5
1,686
24.4
2,117
13.0

Above Threshold
N
Mean
1,722
19.8
1,679
15.5
1,679
26.3
1,679
21.7
2,101
14.3

Share in Poverty
City/Urban Locale
Suburban Locale
Town Locale
Share Enrollment Black
Share Enrollment
Hispanic
2,117
17.3
2,101
18.6
Enrollment (1,000s)
2,117
4.5
2,101
6.0
Notes: Analytic sample includes observations where percentile of doubled-up students is
within 5 percentiles of estimated threshold. Observations are school district by year.
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Figure 3.1 South Carolina 2014 School Districts receiving McKinney Vento Grant by
Number of Homeless Students Percentile

Notes: Data come from Department of Education’s EDFacts database, file specification
C118. Graph shows South Carolina school districts ranked from least homeless students to
most, by whether it received a McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance grant in the 201718 school year. Each circle is one district.
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Figure 3.2 Average number of districts receiving a grant by percentile

Notes: Data come from Department of Education’s EDFacts database, file specification
C118. Graph shows school districts ranked from least homeless students to most within
each state and year. Dots are the percent of districts receiving a grant for each 0.5
percentile.
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Figure 3.3 Percent of LEAs Receiving Grants

Notes: Data come from Section 1.9 of Consolidated State Performance Reports. Line
shows percent of LEAs average number of LEAs receiving a McKinney-Vento grant each
year from 2006-2017. Vertical red line shows when the additional $70 million from the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act took place.
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Figure 3.4 Manipulation

Notes: This graph shows the distribution of districts around the estimated thresholds with
a bin width of one percentile. Data on homelessness and enrollment come from EDFacts.
Threshold is estimated by finding the state-by-year percentile of homeless students most
increasing a district’s discontinuous probability of receiving a McKinney-Vento grant
within the bandwidth of five. The x-axis shows districts’ percentiles away from the
estimated threshold.
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Figure 3.5 Discontinuity

Notes: Data on homelessness and enrollment come from EDFacts. Threshold is estimated
by finding the state-by-year percentile of homeless students most increasing a district’s
discontinuous probability of receiving a McKinney-Vento grant within the bandwidth of
five. The estimated threshold is then used to find each district’s state-by-year distance to
the threshold to be used as the running variable for the fuzzy regression discontinuity. This
graph shows the first stage of predicting the likelihood of receiving a grant the following
year. The x-axis shows districts’ percentiles away from the estimated threshold. Markers
show average outcomes for districts within the bandwidth, binned, at 0.20 percentiles.
3,312 observations.
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Figure 3.6 Homelessness
Panel A. Share Sheltered

Panel B. Share Doubled Up

Notes: Data on homelessness and enrollment come from EDFacts. Threshold is estimated
by finding the state-by-year percentile of homeless students most increasing a district’s
discontinuous probability of receiving a McKinney-Vento grant within the bandwidth of
five. The estimated threshold is then used to find each district’s state-by-year distance to
the threshold to be used as the running variable for the fuzzy regression discontinuity. The
first stage is predicting the likelihood of receiving a grant the following year, which is then
used to estimate effects. The x-axis shows districts’ percentiles away from the estimated
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threshold. Markers show average outcomes for districts within the bandwidth, binned, at
0.20 percentiles. 3,312 observations.
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Figure 3.7 Test Proficiency
Panel A. Percent of Homeless Students Proficient on Math

Panel B. Percent of Homeless Students Proficient on Reading

Notes: Data on homelessness and enrollment come from EDFacts. Threshold is estimated
by finding the state-by-year percentile of homeless students most increasing a district’s
discontinuous probability of receiving a McKinney-Vento grant within the bandwidth of
five. The estimated threshold is then used to find each district’s state-by-year distance to
the threshold to be used as the running variable for the fuzzy regression discontinuity. The
first stage is predicting the likelihood of receiving a grant the following year, which is then
used to estimate effects. The x-axis shows districts’ percentiles away from the estimated
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threshold. Markers show average outcomes for districts within the bandwidth, binned, at
0.20 percentiles. 2,621 and 2,620 observations, respectively.
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Figure 3.8 Math Proficiency by Grade
Panel A. Percent of Homeless Students Proficient on Math – 3rd Grade

Panel B. Percent of Homeless Students Proficient on Math – High School

Notes: Data on homelessness and enrollment come from EDFacts. Threshold is estimated
by finding the state-by-year percentile of homeless students most increasing a district’s
discontinuous probability of receiving a McKinney-Vento grant within the bandwidth of
five. The estimated threshold is then used to find each district’s state-by-year distance to
the threshold to be used as the running variable for the fuzzy regression discontinuity. The
first stage is predicting the likelihood of receiving a grant the following year, which is then
used to estimate effects. The x-axis shows districts’ percentiles away from the estimated
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threshold. Markers show average outcomes for districts within the bandwidth, binned, at
0.20 percentiles. 1,299 ad 929 observations, respectively.
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Figure 3.9 Reading Proficiency by Grade
Panel A. Percent of Homeless Students Proficient on Reading – 3rd Grade

Panel B. Percent of Homeless Students Proficient on Reading – High School

Notes: Data on homelessness and enrollment come from EDFacts. Threshold is estimated
by finding the state-by-year percentile of homeless students most increasing a district’s
discontinuous probability of receiving a McKinney-Vento grant within the bandwidth of
five. The estimated threshold is then used to find each district’s state-by-year distance to
the threshold to be used as the running variable for the fuzzy regression discontinuity. The
first stage is predicting the likelihood of receiving a grant the following year, which is then
used to estimate effects. The x-axis shows districts’ percentiles away from the estimated
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threshold. Markers show average outcomes for districts within the bandwidth, binned, at
0.20 percentiles. 1,297 and 957 observations, respectively.
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Figure 3.10 Revenue
Panel A. Revenue from City/County Government per Student

Panel B. Title I Funding per student

Notes: Data on homelessness and enrollment come from EDFacts. Threshold is estimated
by finding the state-by-year percentile of homeless students most increasing a district’s
discontinuous probability of receiving a McKinney-Vento grant within the bandwidth of
five. The estimated threshold is then used to find each district’s state-by-year distance to
the threshold to be used as the running variable for the fuzzy regression discontinuity. The
first stage is predicting the likelihood of receiving a grant the following year, which is then
used to estimate effects. The x-axis shows districts’ percentiles away from the estimated
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threshold. Markers show average outcomes for districts within the bandwidth, binned, at
0.20 percentiles.
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Figure 3.11 Expenditures
Panel A. Support Service Expenditures per student

Panel B. Transportation Expenditures per student

Notes: Data on homelessness and enrollment come from EDFacts. Threshold is estimated
by finding the state-by-year percentile of homeless students most increasing a district’s
discontinuous probability of receiving a McKinney-Vento grant within the bandwidth of
five. The estimated threshold is then used to find each district’s state-by-year distance to
the threshold to be used as the running variable for the fuzzy regression discontinuity. The
first stage is predicting the likelihood of receiving a grant the following year, which is then
used to estimate effects. The x-axis shows districts’ percentiles away from the estimated
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threshold. Markers show average outcomes for districts within the bandwidth, binned, at
0.20 percentiles. 1,688 observations.
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Figure 3.12 Harassment Allegations
Panel A. Harassment Allegations per 1,000 Students - Race

Panel B. Harassment Allegations per 1,000 Students – Disability

Notes: Data on homelessness and enrollment come from EDFacts. Threshold is estimated
by finding the state-by-year percentile of homeless students most increasing a district’s
discontinuous probability of receiving a McKinney-Vento grant within the bandwidth of
five. The estimated threshold is then used to find each district’s state-by-year distance to
the threshold to be used as the running variable for the fuzzy regression discontinuity. The
first stage is predicting the likelihood of receiving a grant the following year, which is then
used to estimate effects. The x-axis shows districts’ percentiles away from the estimated
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threshold. Markers show average outcomes for districts within the bandwidth, binned, at
0.20 percentiles. 842 observations.
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Figure 3.13 Suspensions
Panel A. In-School Suspensions per 1,000 Students

Panel B. Out-of-School Suspensions per 1,000 Students

Notes: Data on homelessness and enrollment come from EDFacts. Threshold is estimated
by finding the state-by-year percentile of homeless students most increasing a district’s
discontinuous probability of receiving a McKinney-Vento grant within the bandwidth of
five. The estimated threshold is then used to find each district’s state-by-year distance to
the threshold to be used as the running variable for the fuzzy regression discontinuity. The
first stage is predicting the likelihood of receiving a grant the following year, which is then
used to estimate effects. The x-axis shows districts’ percentiles away from the estimated
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threshold. Markers show average outcomes for districts within the bandwidth, binned, at
0.20 percentiles. 844 observations.
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Figure 3.14 Homeless Students per 10,000 Students
Panel A. Sheltered Students per 10,000 Students

Panel B. Doubled-Up Students per 10,000 Students

Notes: Data come from Section 1.9 of Consolidated State Performance Reports. Vertical
line shows when the additional $70 million from the American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act took place. Markers show coefficients from estimated models, with the shaded area
showing the 95% confidence intervals. Model is event study framework, with an indicator
for each school year with the omitted base year of 2009. Control variables include
AFDC/TANF recipients per capita, state EITC rate, gross state product per capita,
unemployment rate, the number of persons food insecure per capita, poverty rate, if the
governor is Democrat, fraction of state House Democrat, fraction of state Senate Democrat,
percent of population identifying as white and number of eviction filings. 528 observations.
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Figure 3.15 Interactions with Increasing Percent of Districts Receiving Grants
Panel A. Sheltered Students per 10,000 Students

Panel B. Doubled-Up Students per 10,000 Students

Notes: Data come from Section 1.9 of Consolidated State Performance Reports. Vertical
line shows when the additional $70 million from the American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act took place. Markers show coefficients from estimated models, with the shaded area
showing the 95% confidence intervals. Model is event study framework, with an indicator
for each school year interacted with if the district increase the percent of districts receiving
a grant by more than 10%, with the omitted base year of 2009. Control variables include
AFDC/TANF recipients per capita, state EITC rate, gross state product per capita,
unemployment rate, the number of persons food insecure per capita, poverty rate, if the
governor is Democrat, fraction of state House Democrat, fraction of state Senate Democrat,
percent of population identifying as white and number of eviction filings. 292 observations.
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CHAPTER 4. THE DYNAMICS AND MEASUREMENT OF HIGH SCHOOL HOMELESSNESS AND
ACHIEVEMENT DISPARITIES
4.1

Introduction
Are students who experience homelessness less likely than their housed peers to

graduate high school and attend college? How do estimates of these links change when
using different commonly used ways to identify who is homeless? Using administrative
student-level data over 12 years from a mid-sized public school district in the Southern
United States, referred to as the District, we examine the dynamic patterns of student
housing insecurity and estimate graduation and college going disparities between students
who experience homelessness and those that do not. Our secondary school and transition
to college focus is distinct from much of the homelessness-academic outcomes literature
that largely concentrates on test scores of primary and middle school students. These
studies generally find that homeless students tend to score lower on standardized tests than
do housed students (Cowen, 2017; De Gregorio et al., 2020; Obradović et al., 2009;
Rafferty et al., 2004). A separate set of studies investigates college students and generally
finds that homeless college students face significant barriers related to affording college,
meeting basic needs, and receiving housing services (e.g., Broton & Goldrick-Rab, 2018;
Crutchfield, 2018; GAO, 2016; Skobba et al., 2018).
We first document the dynamic nature of homelessness among high school
students. Homelessness is not a stable characteristic; rather, students can move in and out
of experiencing it. Studies of other measures of material insufficiency recognize such
dynamics as important; for example, researchers have attempted to understand patterns and
consequences for children’s being more likely to live in households that transition in and
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out of food insecurity rather than have persistent food insecurity across their whole lifetime
(e.g., Hamersma & Kim, 2015; Rank & Hirschl, 2009). Understanding students’ dynamic
and diverse homelessness experiences can be important to create supports for housing
insecure high school students. Such dynamics also matter because they contribute to
differences in how states and researchers “count” homeless students and calculate
achievement gaps between homeless and housed students. We show that common
approaches to defining homelessness can yield widely different estimates of homelessnesshoused high school graduation disparities. Such differences can impede across-state
comparisons that contribute to targeted and efficient policymaking and have implications
for funding since the federal government targets funds to districts that have the most
homeless students and largest achievement gaps (Cunningham et al., 2010).
4.2

Background and Context
Students who experience homelessness can face educational challenges. Homeless

students often double up—i.e., share housing with another household due to economic
hardship or related reason—which can shape students’ educational experiences and cause
absences through issues like intra-household conflicts, child-rearing responsibilities, lack
of study space, and competing demands (Hallett, 2012; Pavlakis, 2018). Homeless students
are more likely to move residences and transfer schools, both of which can reduce
scholastic engagement, hinder participation in extracurricular activities, or lead students to
miss opportunities such as dual-enrollment classes and college counseling (GAO, 2016;
Cowen, 2017). Further, homelessness is commonly accompanied by poverty and food
insecurity which can negatively affect academics and limit students’ ability to afford
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postsecondary expenses (e.g., GAO, 2016; Harvey, 2020; Heflin, Darolia, & KuklaAcevedo, 2020; Michelmore & Dynarski, 2017; Pilkauskas et al., 2014; Miller, 2011).
Housing insecurity and homelessness are difficult to measure in part because it is
complicated to disentangle the deleterious effects of homelessness from other factors
related to poverty and material insufficiency. Moreover, housing security is best
characterized as existing on a spectrum ranging from secure—where a student has access
to fixed, regular, and suitable housing—to insecure, where housing is less stable, more
variable, and less adequate; homelessness occurs at the severe insecurity end. This range
presents difficulty in pinpointing students’ places on a multifaceted scale, especially with
incomplete information. For example, districts (including the data we use from the District)
often capture only a dichotomous measure of homelessness and do not observe
circumstances such as rent burden and overcrowding.
Identifying students experiencing homelessness has likely been exacerbated from
remote learning induced by the COVID-19 pandemic. Districts often rely on surveys of
students living situation at time of enrollment and on-the-ground identification by school
personnel including bus drivers, teacher, and staff. Remote learning presents additional
challenges in measuring students’ housing insecurity as districts have even less information
to go on, losing informal observations by personnel. In the case of the District, looking at
the cumulative number of students identified by school week suggests potentially large
under-identification, shown in Figure 4.1. In the 2020-2021 school year in which the
district had been entirely remote learning due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the number of
students identified as homeless has been well below the number in previous years. As of
March, the number of students identified is about half of the number as the 2019-2020
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school year and a third of the 2018-2019 school year’s number. While the number of
students identified has been catching up to the average number across the other three years,
it has only increased from 66% lower in September 2020 to 53% lower in March 2021. In
theory, there could be fewer students experiencing homelessness in the district. However,
this seems unlikely given the large economic downturn, increase in unemployment, and
lack of a significant change in the District’s enrollment. The difficulty in measuring
homelessness is thus a likely cause of the perceived decrease in homelessness.
We focus on the temporal aspect of homelessness in this paper, which further
impedes districts’ ability to consistently measure homelessness (Aviles de Bradley, 2011;
Hallett, 2012). Students can cross into and out of what is considered homelessness
repeatedly, which is one reason scholars and practitioners characterize homelessness as an
experience rather than a permanent condition (O’Flaherty, 2019). Students experiencing
homelessness commonly transition back to being housed, although the barriers faced
during homelessness—e.g., lack of resources and instability—often persist. The US
Department of Education (ED) recognizes this phenomenon, requiring districts to continue
providing services for the entire school year even if a homeless student becomes housed
(NCHE, 2020).
This dynamism contributes to a lack of clear consensus on how to measure
homelessness in high school. Consider three different definitions of homelessness based
on common state practices (Low et al., 2017; NCHE, 2020) illustrated in Table 4.1.
Students in categories A, B, C, and D completed all four years of high school, whereas
students in categories E, F, and G dropped out before 12th grade. First, consider the Ever
Homeless definition, which includes students who districts identify as homeless at any
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point in high school. In the table, this means that the graduation of students in categories
A, B, C, E, and F are compared against students considered housed in categories D and G.
Next, consider the District’s definition, Last Status, which is based on the final observed
status of students, including those who dropped out. In this definition, graduation of
students in categories A, B, and E is compared against students considered housed in
categories C, D, F, and G. In other words, students who were housed in 12 th grade, but
homeless in a prior grade (category C) are considered homeless in the Ever Homeless
definition but considered housed in the Last Status definition. Similarly, students who
dropped out before 12th grade, whose last status was housed, but were homeless at some
point earlier in high school (category F), are considered homeless in the Ever Homeless
definition but considered housed in the Last Status definition. Finally, consider the 12th
Grade Status definition – in this scenario, students who drop out before 12th grade are not
included in the sample (categories E, F, and G). Relative to Last Status and 12th Grade
Status, Ever Homeless is the most inclusive in which students count as homeless.
4.3

Dynamics of High School Homelessness
Our analysis sample includes all roughly 21,300 students who entered 9 th grade in

the District from the 2007-08 to 2013-14 academic years and follows students for six years.
About 2.1% of students in our sample are identified as being homeless at some point in
their high school careers, which is close to national estimates of 2.3% of high school
students experiencing homelessness in a given year (NCES, 2017). After 12 th grade, we
observe whether students graduated or enrolled in a postsecondary institution based on a
National Student Clearinghouse match.
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In Figure 4.2, we display the dynamics of high school homelessness among the
2.1% of students in our data experiencing homelessness at some point during high school.
Starting at the far left of the graph is students’ 9th grade status: by construction, every
student is either homeless (46%) or housed (54%) to start the year. From the start of 9 th to
the start of 10th, 11th, and 12th grades (moving from left to right on the graph), students can
belong in one of four mutually exclusive categories: continued to the next grade and is
housed, continued to the next grade and is homeless, dropped out, or transferred to another
district. For these latter two categories, conceivably a student could return to school or
transfer back in, but we never observe these actions in our data. For students that repeat
grades (33% of ever homeless students), we use the last observed housing status.
Roughly half of the students experiencing homelessness each year become housed
the following year. Homeless students who do not become housed the next grade have
about an equal likelihood of still experiencing homelessness the next year, dropping out of
school, or transferring to another district. Among students who experience homelessness
in high school and stay in school for four years, only <1% of students are homeless all four
years in high school, 3% are homeless 3 years, 16% are homeless 2 years, and 81% are
homeless 1 year. Among those with two years of observed homelessness in high school,
89% experience in consecutive years, while 11% have a break of at least a year between
recorded homelessness. Homeless students drop out or transfer at a higher rate than housed
students. About 38% of the students that experience homelessness at some point in grades
9-11 drop out or transfer before 12th grade, as compared to about 17% of always housed
students.
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These observed dynamics of homelessness demonstrate the fluctuation in housing
circumstances students experience as they transition in and out of observed homelessness
over time in high school. Resultingly, how districts measure and consider previous
experiences of homelessness can change which students count as homeless and the
supports for which students qualify. For example, under the McKinney Vento Act, the
federal government requires districts to provide homeless students resources such as
transportation, expedited enrollment, tutoring, assistance with participating in school
programs, and other academic supports and social services (Cunningham, et al., 2010).
4.4

Homelessness, High School Graduation, and College Going
We next consider how using the different ways to measure homelessness result in

different estimates of the links between homelessness and high school graduation or
college going within six years of starting high school. We separately estimate these
outcomes, Y, for each student i as a linear function of homelessness, H:
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛾𝐻𝑖 + 𝜂𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖
Here, we use the three definitions described in Table 1 and estimate separate regressions
for each definition. In some specifications, we control for observed student 9th grade
characteristics

in

the

X-vector:

sex

(male/female/other),

race/ethnicity

(Black/Asian/Hispanic/American Indian/Native Hawaiian/White/Multiple/Other), school
attended, school year first enrolled in 9th grade, and zip code of the students’ residence; we
also include indicators for whether in high school the student ever qualified for
free/reduced-price lunch, had an individual education plan, was identified as an English
language learner, or was identified as gifted/talented. Our results should not be interpreted
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as estimates the effect of homelessness on outcomes; rather, they are useful to illustrate
how homelessness definition differences affect estimates of homelessness-housed
achievement disparities, while conditioning on factors that districts can reasonably collect.
We exclude students who transfer out of the district from our analysis in this section and
consider students who drop out as not graduating. Using a logit yields similar results that
are available upon request.
We display estimates of the unconditional relationship between homelessness in
high school and graduation in the topmost row of Figure 4.3, with bars showing 95%
confidence intervals. The magnitude of the homelessness-housed graduation rate gap
differs markedly depending on how homelessness is defined. Students considered
homeless under the Last Status definition (triangle marker) have graduation rates that are
32 percentage points lower than their housed peers; Ever Homeless students (circle marker)
have graduation rates that are 17 percentage points lower, and 12th Grade Status (square
marker) students have graduation rates 4 percentage points lower (this last estimate is not
statistically different than zero). These results mean that homeless student graduation rates
are about 61%, 80%, and 96% of the housed student graduation rates for the Last Status,
Ever Homeless, and 12th Grade Status definitions, respectively. Complicating the
interpretation of the magnitude across scenarios is that the composition, and thus
graduation rate, of the comparison group differs under each definition (recall Table 1).
Graduation estimates conditional on observed covariates are in the second row of the
figure. Students experiencing homelessness in high school still have lower graduation rates
than housed students, although the conditional gaps narrow, ranging from 2-26 percentage
points.
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In the bottom half of Figure 4.3, we present results from estimates of enrolling in
college within six years after entering high school. In these estimates, we only include
students who graduated high school. Estimated parameters are similar across scenarios. In
the unconditional estimates in the third row, students who experience homelessness in high
school enroll in college at a rate of about 20-24 percentage points lower than housed
students. In estimates accounting for student characteristics (bottom row), the gap again
narrows; students experiencing homelessness in high school enroll in college at a rate 5-9
percentage points lower than housed peers. In the Last Status and 12th Grade Status
scenarios, the 95% confidence interval includes zero.
Figure 4.4 presents results for disparities in college enrollment by 2-year and 4-year
colleges. Similar to college enrollment overall, there are only minor differences across
definitions when splitting college enrollment by 2-year or 4-year college. Additionally,
Only a small homelessness-housed gap exists in 2-year college enrollment rates even when
not conditioning on students’ observable characteristics. On the other hand, the bottom
panel suggests high school homelessness relates with a lower likelihood of enrolling in a
4-year college, averaging about 19 percentage points lower than housed students. Housing
security may not be the cause of the lower rate, however, as including controls narrows the
gap to close to zero. These results suggest that, although students experiencing
homelessness in high school are less likely to enroll in a 4-year college, the supports needed
to close the gap may not be unique to housing insecure students.
4.5

Conclusion
Homeless students are less likely to graduate high school than consistently housing

secure students. Yet, estimates of the magnitude of the disparity differ greatly depending
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on various commonly used definitions of which students “count” as homeless: our
estimates range from a 4-32 percentage points in unconditional comparisons and 2-26
percentage points when taking into account student characteristics that districts commonly
record. The use of multiple definitions of homelessness complicates comparisons of
homelessness-housed educational gaps across states and districts, impeding a full
understanding of the homelessness problem across states and hindering research and
practice that can help identify solutions and policies to support housing insecure students.
One way to calculate graduation disparities is to compare homeless students in 12 th
grade to housed students in 12th grade. This approach likely understates the severity of
homelessness in districts because it does not consider students who drop out prior to 12th
grade and homeless students are more likely to drop out than housed students. In the
District, this approach misses about 75% of students who experienced homelessness and
results in the smallest graduation gap.
Considering two other common, but more comprehensive ways to define
homelessness illustrates a tradeoff between targeting students most at risk for not
graduating from high school and being inclusive. The key distinction between these two
definitions relates to how to consider students who were homeless but become housed:
these students are considered homeless in an Ever Homeless approach but housed when
recognizing Last Status. For this reason, Ever Homeless counts the most students as
homeless. This can be important because homeless students can continue to face other
forms of material insufficiency and stressors after they become housed, and not being
homeless is not equivalent to being housing secure. The ED requires districts to continue
providing services (e.g., transportation, academic assistance) to rehoused homeless
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students for the remainder of a school year in recognition of these challenges, but these
supports do not persist in subsequent years.
Yet, our findings also suggest that while homeless students who transition to housed
are likely to face greater challenges than always housed peers, these homeless-to-housed
students are potentially better poised to graduate than peers whose last observed status is
homeless. These findings echo those of Cassidy (2020), who finds that homeless students’
academic achievement can rebound after becoming rehoused. They likewise are consistent
with results from De Gregorio et al. (2020) in finding students to have worse educational
outcomes in the year of homelessness as opposed to in years after becoming rehoused. In
this way, the Last Status definition may be best suited to identify those at most risk of
severe negative academic outcomes, even though it is more restrictive than an approach
that counts students that ever experience homelessness.
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4.6

Tables and Figures

Table 4.1 Student Housing Status and Measuring Homelessness

Ever
Grade Homeless
Status
pre-12th

12th
Group

Last
Observed
pre-12th
Status

Ever
Homeless

Last
Status

12th Grade
Status

A

Homeless

Yes

n/a

Homeless

Homeless

Homeless

B

Homeless

No

n/a

Homeless

Homeless

Homeless

C

Housed

Yes

n/a

Homeless

Housed

Housed

D

Housed

No

n/a

Housed

Housed

Housed

Yes

Homeless

Homeless

Homeless

Yes

Housed

Homeless

Housed

No

Housed

Housed

Housed

Homeless Student Graduation Rate

66%

51%

93%

Housed Student Graduation Rate

83%

83%

97%

Homeless Student College Going Rate

43%

47%

45%

Housed Student College Going Rate

67%

67%

67%

E
F
G

Not
Enrolled
Not
Enrolled
Not
Enrolled

Not in
sample
Not in
sample
Not in
sample

Note: We shade grey categories of students that are identified differently across definitions.
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Figure 4.1 Number of Students Identified as Homeless by School Week

Notes: Figure shows the cumulative number of students identified as homeless at that point
in the school year by school year. Percentages shown within the figure is how much lower
the number of students identified as homeless in 2020-2021 is relative to the average
number by that month across the other three years.
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Figure 4.2 Dynamics of High School Homelessness among Students Homeless in High
School

Notes: Figure shows the dynamics of homelessness for students observed in 9 th grade in
the District and experience homelessness at some point in grades 9-12. Every student in 9th
grade is either homeless or housed. Size of bars is weighted by the proportion of students
fitting the categories. Moving from left to right shows the share of students going into other
categories between the two nodes. Blue nodes are students that are housed that grade; red
nodes are students that are homeless that grade. Yellow and green nodes are for students
that drop out or transfer, respectively, at some point between the grade before and that
grade.
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Figure 4.3 Estimates of Homelessness-Housed Gaps in High School Graduation and
College Enrollment

Notes: Graph shows relationships between high school homelessness and high school
graduation/college enrollment. Each line shows the relationship from a different
estimation. Markers show the relationship with experiencing homelessness in that grade
relative to students observed that grade not experiencing homelessness. Bars show 95%
confidence intervals for robust standard errors for each respective marker. The outcome
for the top panel is graduating from high school and for the bottom panel is enrolling in
college within two years of leaving high school, taking a value of 1 if enrollment is
observed and 0 otherwise. Controls include observed student 9th grade characteristics: sex
(male/female/other), race/ethnicity (Black/Asian/Hispanic/American Indian/Native
Hawaiian/White/Multiple/Other), school attended, school year the student entered 9 th
grade, and zip code of the students’ listed residence. We also create four variables for
whether the student in high school ever qualified for free or reduced-price lunch, had an
individual education plan, identified as an English language learner, and identified as gifted
and talented. Observations are student level for students observed in 9 th grade and did not
transfer to another school district during high school. Estimations for college enrollment
further limit the sample to students observed graduating from high school. The number of
observations are as follows: Graduation, Ever Homeless/Last Status – 21,319; Graduation,
12th Grade Homelessness – 17,750; College enrollment, Ever Homeless/Last Status –
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17,590; College enrollment, 12 Grade Homelessness – 17,200. The number of observations
are the same for both estimations with and without controls.
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Figure 4.4 Estimates of Homelessness-Housed Gaps in College Enrollment by College
Type

Notes: Graph shows relationships between high school homelessness and college
enrollment. Each line shows the relationship from a different estimation. Markers show the
relationship with experiencing homelessness in that grade relative to students observed that
grade not experiencing homelessness. Bars show 95% confidence intervals for robust
standard errors for each respective marker. Controls include observed student 9th grade
characteristics: sex (male/female/other), race/ethnicity (Black/Asian/Hispanic/American
Indian/Native Hawaiian/White/Multiple/Other), school attended, school year the student
entered 9th grade, and zip code of the students’ listed residence. We also create four
variables for whether the student in high school ever qualified for free or reduced-price
lunch, had an individual education plan, identified as an English language learner, and
identified as gifted and talented. Observations are student level for students observed in 9th
grade and did not transfer to another school district during high school. Estimations for
college enrollment further limit the sample to students observed graduating from high
school. The number of observations are 17,590 for Last Status and Ever Homeless
estimations and 17,200 for 12th Grade Homeless definitions.
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APPENDIX 1. Weighting Control Trends
First, I create annual averages of the rate of homelessness for control CoCs, where
Outcomec,t is the homelessness outcome for CoC c in year t, if the CoC never merged.
𝑁

1
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡 = ∑ 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑐,𝑡
𝑁
𝑐=1

Second, I create a frequency weight for each year that is the number of mergers for that
year, divided by the total number of mergers for the balanced panel (eighteen mergers).
For example, five mergers occurred in 2010, so 2010 has a weight of 27.8%.
∑𝑁
𝑐=1 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑐,𝑡
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟_𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑡 = 𝑇
∑𝑡=1 ∑𝑁
𝑐=1 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑐,𝑡
Third, for each year from treatment, j, I create a weight from years from treatment that is
the year weight depending on years from treatment.
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑗 = 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟_𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝟏[𝑡 − 𝜏 = 𝑗])
Fourth, I then multiply each weight for years from treatment by the control’s average
outcomes for each year.
𝑊_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡,𝑗 = 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑡,𝑗 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝒕
Lastly, I aggregate weighted control outcomes by year to create a weighted control
outcome for years from treatment.
𝑇

𝑊_𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑗 = ∑ 𝑊_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑗,𝑡
𝑡=1
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APPENDIX 2. Appendix for Chapter 2
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Post-Merger
Standard Error
Observations
Number of CoCs

Total Beds

PSH

HHI

Award

Service
Providers

Award per
Provider

0.144
(0.728)

-0.357
(0.328)

0.033
(0.028)

-905
(1,236)

-0.002
(0.007)

-1.374
(5.275)

3,794
353

3,794
353

3,772
352

3,758
353

3,758
353

3,751
353
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Pre-Treatment Mean
19.48
6.46
0.175
42,637
0.188
217.6
Lower Bound Pct of Mean
-6.62%
-15.50%
-12.00%
-7.82%
-9.04%
-4.94%
Point Estimate Pct of
0.74%
-5.53%
18.86%
-2.12%
-1.06%
-0.63%
Mean
Upper Bound Pct of Mean
8.09%
4.46%
50.29%
3.58%
6.38%
4.60%
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the CoC level in parentheses. Control variables per capita income, unemployment
rate, new low-income housing tax credit units, the share of the population black, Asian, and Hispanic, population density,
poverty rate, 0-bedroom fair market rent, if the governor is a Democrat, TANF 2-person benefit, state labor force per
capita, and CoC, and year fixed effects are included in all models. Model is two-way fixed effects with “post-merger” a
variable taking the value of one for a CoC after it merges and zero otherwise. Lower/Upper Bound Pct of Mean are lower
and upper bounds of the 95% confidence interval in units of percent of the pre-treatment mean. Data are for years 20072017. CoCs that merged in 2007, 2008, and 2015-2017 are dropped from the sample to create a balanced sample. ***
p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Table B1. Estimates of Operational Measures – Rest of State

Post-Merger
Standard Error
Observations
Number of CoCs

Total Beds

PSH

HHI

Award

Service
Providers

Award per Provider

-0.153
(0.384)

-0.259
(0.300)

-0.002
(0.017)

-1,002
(1,084)

-0.006
(0.008)

4.430
(5.529)

3,839
357

3,839
357

3,822
357

3,803
357

3,803
357

3,803
357
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Pre-Treatment Mean
14.12
5.073
0.258
33,738
0.147
211.2
Lower Bound Pct of Mean
-6.43%
-16.74%
-13.57%
-9.29%
-14.29%
-3.05%
Point Estimate Pct of
Mean
-1.08%
-5.11%
-0.78%
-2.97%
-4.08%
2.10%
Upper Bound Pct of Mean
4.26%
6.52%
11.63%
3.35%
6.12%
7.25%
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the CoC level in parentheses. Control variables per capita income, unemployment rate, new
low-income housing tax credit units, the share of the population black, Asian, and Hispanic, population density, poverty rate, 0bedroom fair market rent, if the governor is a Democrat, TANF 2-person benefit, state labor force per capita, and CoC, and year
fixed effects are included in all models. Model is two-way fixed effects with “post-merger” a variable taking the value of one
for a CoC after it merges and zero otherwise. Lower/Upper Bound Pct of Mean are lower and upper bounds of the 95% confidence
interval in units of percent of the pre-treatment mean. Data are for years 2007-2017. CoCs that merged in 2007, 2008, and 20152017 are dropped from the sample to create a balanced sample relative to years from treatment. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, *
p<0.05
Table B2. Estimates of Operational Measures – Neighbors

Post-Merger
Standard Error
Observations
Number of CoCs

Total Homeless

Unsheltered

Sheltered

Chronic

Non-Chronic

0.735
(1.045)

0.480
(0.392)

0.255
(0.844)

0.059
(0.226)

0.676
(0.938)

3,796
353

3,796
353

3,796
353

3,796
353

3,796
353
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Pre Treated Mean
19.50
6.695
12.80
3.604
15.89
Lower Bound Pct of Mean
-6.77%
-4.33%
-10.98%
-10.68%
-7.35%
Point Estimate Pct of Mean
3.77%
7.17%
1.99%
1.64%
4.25%
Upper Bound Pct of Mean
14.31%
18.69%
14.96%
13.96%
15.86%
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the CoC level in parentheses. Control variables per capita income, unemployment rate, new
low-income housing tax credit units, the share of the population black, Asian, and Hispanic, population density, poverty rate, 0bedroom fair market rent, if the governor is a Democrat, TANF 2-person benefit, state labor force per capita, and CoC, and year
fixed effects are included in all models. Model is two-way fixed effects with “post-merger” a variable taking the value of one
for a CoC after it merges and zero otherwise. Lower/Upper Bound Pct of Mean are lower and upper bounds of the 95% confidence
interval in units of percent of the pre-treatment mean. Data are for years 2007-2017. CoCs that merged in 2007, 2008, and 20152017 are dropped from the sample to create a balanced sample relative to years from treatment. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Table B3. Estimates of Homelessness Measures – Rest of State

Post-Merger
Standard Error
Observations
Number of CoCs

Total Homeless

Unsheltered

Sheltered

Chronic

Non-Chronic

1.117
(0.606)

1.140
(0.589)

-0.023
(0.343)

0.258
(0.237)

0.859
(0.481)

3,841
357

3,841
357

3,841
357

3,841
357

3,841
357
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Pre Treated Mean
12.85
4.654
8.196
2.233
10.62
Lower Bound Pct of Mean
-0.58%
-0.41%
-8.50%
-9.27%
-0.82%
Point Estimate Pct of Mean
8.69%
24.50%
-0.28%
11.55%
8.09%
Upper Bound Pct of Mean
17.96%
49.38%
7.96%
32.42%
17.00%
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the CoC level in parentheses. Control variables per capita income, unemployment rate, new
low-income housing tax credit units, the share of the population black, Asian, and Hispanic, population density, poverty rate, 0bedroom fair market rent, if the governor is a Democrat, TANF 2-person benefit, state labor force per capita, and CoC, and year
fixed effects are included in all models. Model is two-way fixed effects with “post-merger” a variable taking the value of one
for a CoC after it merges and zero otherwise. Lower/Upper Bound Pct of Mean are lower and upper bounds of the 95% confidence
interval in units of percent of the pre-treatment mean. Data are for years 2007-2017. CoCs that merged in 2007, 2008, and 20152017 are dropped from the sample to create a balanced sample relative to years from treatment. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Table B4. Estimates of Homelessness Measures – Neighbors
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Notes: Dark, solid lines are 2016 CoC boundaries. Dotted, blue lines are historical boundaries prior to merging.

Northeast

Midwest

South

West
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Figure B1. Historical Continuum of Care Boundaries

Figure B2. CoC Mergers
Panel A. All Mergers

Panel B. All First Mergers

Panel C. First Mergers for Balanced CoCs

Notes: Panel A shows the total number of mergers by year. Panel B is limited to first
mergers. Panel C is further limited to only first mergers for CoC in the balanced panel,
which only uses 2010-2013 as treatment years.
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Figure B3. Trends between Merged and Control CoCs
Panel A. HMIS PSH Rate

Panel B. Total Beds

Panel C. PSH Beds

Panel D. HHI

Panel E. Award

Panel F. Service Providers

119

Panel G. Award per Service Providers

Panel H. Total Homeless

Panel I. Unsheltered

Panel J. Sheltered

Panel K. Chronic

Panel L. Non-Chronic

Notes: All panels compare balanced, CoCs merging the first time between 2010-2013, to
CoCs that never merged between 2007-2017. Treatment lines are average levels for
treated CoCs. Control lines are frequency of treatment weighted averages (See Appendix
A for detail).
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Figure B4. Rest of State Time-Varying Generalized Difference-in-Difference – Operations
Measures
Panel A. Total Beds
Panel B. Permanent Supportive Housing

Panel C. HHI

Panel D. Award

Panel E. Award per Service Provider

Notes: Areas in blue show 95% confidence intervals where points are coefficient for each
year from treatment with a base year of -1. Model is event-study design with dummy
variables for each year from treatment taking the value of one for a CoC if it merged and
the observation is j years from treatment and zero otherwise. Control variables, CoC, and
year fixed effects are included in all models. Treatment occurs in period 0. Data are for
years 2007-2017. CoCs that merged in 2007, 2008, and 2015-2017 are dropped from the
sample to create a balanced sample relative to years from treatment. Outcomes are for the
rest of the state of a merged CoC.
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Figure B5. Neighboring CoCs Time-Varying Generalized Difference-in-Difference –
Operations Measures
Panel A. Total Beds
Panel B. Permanent Supportive Housing

Panel C. HHI

Panel D. Award

Panel E. Award per Service Provider

Notes: Areas in blue show 95% confidence intervals where points are coefficient for each
year from treatment with a base year of -1. Model is event-study design with dummy
variables for each year from treatment taking the value of one for a CoC if it merged and
the observation is j years from treatment and zero otherwise. Control variables, CoC, and
year fixed effects are included in all models. Treatment occurs in period 0. Data are for
years 2007-2017. CoCs that merged in 2007, 2008, and 2015-2017 are dropped from the
sample to create a balanced sample relative to years from treatment. Outcomes are for
neighboring CoCs of a merged CoC.
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Figure B6. Rest of State Time-Varying Generalized Difference-in-Difference –
Homelessness Measures
Panel A. Total Homeless

Panel B. Unsheltered

Panel C. Sheltered

Panel D. Chronic

Panel E. Non-Chronic

Notes: Areas in blue show 95% confidence intervals where points are coefficient for each
year from treatment with a base year of -1. Model is event-study design with dummy
variables for each year from treatment taking the value of one for a CoC if it merged and
the observation is j years from treatment and zero otherwise. Control variables, CoC, and
year fixed effects are included in all models. Treatment occurs in period 0. Data are for
years 2007-2017. CoCs that merged in 2007, 2008, and 2015-2017 are dropped from the
sample to create a balanced sample relative to years from treatment. Outcomes are for the
rest of the state of a merged CoC.
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Figure B7. Neighboring CoCs Time-Varying Generalized Difference-in-Difference –
Homelessness Measures
Panel A. Total Homeless

Panel B. Unsheltered

Panel C. Sheltered

Panel D. Chronic

Panel E. Non-Chronic

Notes: Areas in blue show 95% confidence intervals where points are coefficient for each
year from treatment with a base year of -1. Model is event-study design with dummy
variables for each year from treatment taking the value of one for a CoC if it merged and
the observation is j years from treatment and zero otherwise. Control variables, CoC, and
year fixed effects are included in all models. Treatment occurs in period 0. Data are for
years 2007-2017. CoCs that merged in 2007, 2008, and 2015-2017 are dropped from the
sample to create a balanced sample relative to years from treatment. Outcomes are for
neighboring CoCs of a merged CoC.
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Figure B8. Treated Once, Time-Varying Generalized Difference-in-Difference –
Operations Measures
Panel A. HMIS PSH Participation Rate
Panel B. Total Beds

Panel C. Permanent Supportive Housing

Panel D. HHI

Panel E. Award

Panel F. Award per Service Provider
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Treated Once Time-Varying Generalized Difference-in-Difference – Homelessness
Measures
Panel G. Total Homeless

Panel H. Unsheltered

Panel I. Sheltered

Panel J. Chronic

Panel K. Non-Chronic

Notes: Areas in blue show 95% confidence intervals where points are coefficient for each
year from treatment with a base year of -1. Model is event-study design with dummy
variables for each year from treatment taking the value of one for a CoC if it merged and
the observation is j years from treatment and zero otherwise. Control variables, CoC, and
year fixed effects are included in all models. Treatment occurs in period 0. Data are for
years 2007-2017. CoCs that merged in 2007, 2008, and 2015-2017 are dropped from the
sample to create a balanced sample relative to years from treatment. CoCs merging
multiple times are also dropped from the sample.
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Figure B9. Dropping No Changes Time-Varying Generalized Difference-in-Difference –
Homelessness Measures
Panel A. Total Homeless

Panel B. Unsheltered

Panel C. Sheltered

Panel D. Chronic

Panel E. Non-Chronic

Notes: Areas in blue show 95% confidence intervals where points are coefficient for each
year from treatment with a base year of -1. Model is event-study design with dummy
variables for each year from treatment taking the value of one for a CoC if it merged and
the observation is j years from treatment and zero otherwise. Control variables, CoC, and
year fixed effects are included in all models. Treatment occurs in period 0. Data are for
years 2007-2017. CoCs that merged in 2007, 2008, and 2015-2017 are dropped from the
sample to create a balanced sample relative to years from treatment. Observations where
the change in subpopulation is zero are also dropped.
127

Figure B10. No Control Variables, Time-Varying Generalized Difference-in-Difference –
Operations Measures
Panel A. HMIS PSH Participation Rate
Panel B. Total Beds

Panel C. Permanent Supportive Housing

Panel D. HHI

Panel E. Award

Panel F. Award per Service Provider
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No Control Variables
Homelessness Measures
Panel G. Total Homeless

Time-Varying

Generalized

Difference-in-Difference

Panel H. Unsheltered

Panel I. Sheltered

Panel J. Chronic

Panel K. Non-Chronic

–

Notes: Areas in blue show 95% confidence intervals where points are coefficient for each
year from treatment with a base year of -1. Model is event-study design with dummy
variables for each year from treatment taking the value of one for a CoC if it merged and
the observation is j years from treatment and zero otherwise. CoC and year fixed effects
are included in all models. Treatment occurs in period 0. Data are for years 2007-2017.
CoCs that merged in 2007, 2008, and 2015-2017 are dropped from the sample to create a
balanced sample relative to years from treatment.
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Figure B11. Unbalanced Panel, Time-Varying Generalized Difference-in-Difference –
Operations Measures
Panel A. HMIS PSH Participation Rate
Panel B. Total Beds

Panel C. Permanent Supportive Housing

Panel D. HHI

Panel E. Award

Panel F. Award per Service Provider
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Unbalanced Panel, Time-Varying Generalized Difference-in-Difference – Homelessness
Measures
Panel G. Total Homeless

Panel H. Unsheltered

Panel I. Sheltered

Panel J. Chronic

Panel K. Non-Chronic

Notes: Areas in blue show 95% confidence intervals where points are coefficient for each
year from treatment with a base year of -1. Model is event-study design with dummy
variables for each year from treatment taking the value of one for a CoC if it merged and
the observation is j years from treatment and zero otherwise. Control variables and CoC
and year fixed effects are included in all models. Treatment occurs in period 0. Data are
for years 2007-2017. CoCs that merged in 2007, 2008, and 2015-2017 are dropped from
the sample to create a balanced sample relative to years in the sample.
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C1. Definitions from the 2017 Annual Homeless Assessment Report to Congress
Chronically Homeless refers to an individual with a disability who has been continuously
homeless for one year or more or has experienced at least four episodes of homelessness
in the last three years where the combined length of time homeless in those occasions is at
least 12 months.
Continuums of Care (CoC) are local planning bodies responsible for coordinating the full
range of homelessness services in a geographic area, which may cover a city, county,
metropolitan area, or an entire state
Emergency Shelter is a facility with the primary purpose of providing temporary shelter
for homeless people.
Homeless describes a person who lacks a fixed, regular, and adequate nighttime residence.
Homeless Management Information System (HMIS) is a software application designed to
record and store client-level information on the characteristics and service needs of
homeless people. Each CoC maintains its HMIS, which can be tailored to meet local needs
but must also conform to Federal HMIS Data and Technical Standards.
Housing Inventory Count (HIC) is produced by each CoC and provides an annual inventory
of beds that assists people in the CoC who are experiencing homelessness or leaving
homelessness.
An individual refers to a person who is not part of a family with children during an episode
of homelessness. Individuals may be homeless as single adults, unaccompanied youth, or
in multiple-adult or multiple-child households.
People in Families with children are people who are homeless as part of a household that
has at least one adult (age 18 and older) and one child (under age 18).
Permanent Supportive Housing (PSH) is a housing model designed to provide housing
assistance (project- and tenant-based) and supportive services on a long-term basis to
formerly homeless people. HUD’s Continuum of Care program, authorized by the
McKinney-Vento Act, funds PSH and requires that the client have a disability for
eligibility.
Point-in-Time (PIT) Count is an unduplicated 1-night estimate of both sheltered and
unsheltered homeless populations. The 1-night count is conducted according to HUD
standards by CoCs nationwide and occurs during the last 10 days in January of each year.
Sheltered Homelessness refers to people who are staying in emergency shelters,
transitional housing programs, or safe havens.
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Transitional Housing Programs provide people experiencing homelessness a place to stay
combined with supportive services for up to 24 months.
Unsheltered Homelessness refers to people whose primary nighttime location is a public
or private place not designated for, or ordinarily used as, regular sleeping accommodation
for people (for example, the streets, vehicles, or parks).
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Table C2. CoCs Smaller than Counties
Original CoC
Coded CoC
State
Long Beach
Pasadena
Los Angeles County
CA
Glendale
Oxnard
Ventura County
Lakeland
Polk County
FL
Atlanta
DeKalb County
GA
Evanston
Cook County
IL
Chicago
Cambridge
Lowell
Malden/Medford
Middlesex County
Framingham/Waltham
Somerville
MA
Brookline/Newton
Lawrence
Essex
Lynn
Fall City
Bristol
New Bedford
Detroit
Wayne County
MI
Amarillo
Potter County
TX
City of Spokane
Spokane County
WA
Notes: CoCs in table are CoCs smaller than counties. The first column shows the true CoC
while the second shows which CoC I aggregated data to.
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Old ID

Old Name

Consolidated
into ID
AR-503
AR-503
AR-503
AR-503
AR-503

Consolidated into Name

Year

AR-502
AR-506
AR-507
AR-509
AR-510
AR-511
CA-527

Conway/Arkansas River Valley
Johnson, Pope, Yell Counties
Eastern Arkansas
Hot Springs/Southwest Arkansas
Hempstead, Sevier, Howard, Little River
Counties
Jonesboro/Northeast Arkansas
Nevada County

Arkansas BoS
Arkansas BoS
Arkansas BoS
Arkansas BoS
Arkansas BoS

2010
2010
2012
2010
2010

AR-503
CA-515

Arkansas BoS
Roseville, Rocklin/Placer,
Nevada Counties
San Diego City and County
Oxnard, San
Buenaventura/Ventura County
Connecticut BoS
Connecticut BoS
Connecticut BoS
Connecticut BoS
Connecticut BoS
Connecticut BoS
Cook County
Massachusetts BoS
Maine BoS
Michigan BoS
Dakota, Anoka, Washington,
Scott, Carver Counties
Nebraska BoS
Nebraska BoS
Nebraska BoS

2010
2010

CA-610
CA-605

San Diego County
San Buena Ventura/Ventura County

CA-601
CA-611

CT-500
CT-501
CT-504
CT-507
CT-509
CT-510
IL-505
MA-512
ME-501
MI-522
MN-510

Danbury
New Haven
Middletown/Middlesex County
Norwich/New London City & County
New Britain
Bristol
Evanston
Lawrence
Bangor/Penobscot County
Alpena, Iosca, Presque Isle/NE Michigan
Scott, Carver Counties

CT-505
CT-505
CT-505
CT-505
CT-505
CT-505
IL-511
MA-516
ME-500
MI-500
MN-503

NE-503
NE-504
NE-505

Southwest Nebraska
Southeast Nebraska
Panhandle of Nebraska

NE-500
NE-500
NE-500

2011
2013
2011
2013
2010
2010
2011
2011
2011
2013
2012
2010
2011
2011
2011
2011
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NE-506
NJ-505

Northeast Nebraska
Gloucester County

NE-500
NJ-503

NJ-520

Cumberland County

NJ-503

NJ-519

Sussex County

NJ-516

NY-524

Niagara Falls/Niagara County

NY-508

NY-605
OR-504
SC-504

Nassau County
Salem/Marion, Polk Counties
Florence City & County/Pee Dee

NY-603
OR-505
SC-503

TX-501
TX-504
TX-610
TX-613
TX-702
TX-704
VA-512

Corpus Christi/Nueces County
Victoria/Dewitt, Lavaca,Conzales Counties
Denton City & County
Longview/Marshall Area
Montgomery County
Galveston/Gulf Coast
Chesapeake

TX-607
TX-607
TX-607
TX-607
TX-607
TX-607
VA-501

VA-519

Suffolk

VA-501

VA-518

Harrisonburg/ Rockingham County

VA-513

VA-509

Petersburg

VA-521

Nebraska BoS
Camden City &
County/Gloucester, Cape May,
Cumberland Counties
Camden City &
County/Gloucester, Cape May,
Cumberland Counties
Warren, Sussex, Hunterdon
Counties
Buffalo, Niagara Falls/Erie,
Niagara, Orleans, Genesee,
Wyoming Counties
Nassau, Suffolk Counties
Oregon BoS
Myrtle Beach, Sumter City &
County
Texas BoS
Texas BoS
Texas BoS
Texas BoS
Texas BoS
Texas BoS
Norfolk, Chesapeake,
Suffolk/Isle of Wight,
Southampton Counties
Norfolk, Chesapeake,
Suffolk/Isle of Wight,
Southampton Counties
Harrisonburg,
Winchester/Western Virginia
Virginia BoS

2011
2013

2013

2011
2013

2012
2011
2010
2013
2013
2012
2010
2012
2011
2011

2011

2012
2013

VA-510

Staunton/Waynesboro/Augusta, Highland
VA-521
Virginia BoS
Counties
VA-517 Danville/Martinsville
VA-521
Virginia BoS
Notes: List of mergers comes from U.S. Department of Housing Point-in-Time Counts report.
Table C3. Merging CoCs included in analytical sample

2013
2013
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Share Sheltered
Without
With Controls
Controls

Share Doubled Up
Without Controls
With Controls

BW: 5 percentiles
MV Grant Recipient
Observations

0.03 (0.16)
4,218

0.13 (0.15)
3,312

0.14 (0.43)
4,218

0.31 (0.64)
3,312

BW: 10 percentiles
MV Grant Recipient
Observations

-0.02 (0.10)
8,824

0.04 (0.11)
7,095

-0.18 (0.29)
8,824

-0.07 (0.35)
7,095
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BW: 5 percentiles, Quadratic
Distance
MV Grant Recipient
-0.16 (0.18)
-0.15 (0.18)
0.56 (0.82)
0.50 (1.07)
Observations
4,179
3,404
4,179
3,404
Notes: Each cell is a different model, with six models for each outcome. Each outcome has a model with a bandwidth of 5
percentiles, 10 percentiles, and 5 percentiles with quadratic distance instead of linear. Each then also is estimate without and
then with controls. MV Grant Recipient rows show estimated effect of a district’s receiving a McKinney-Vento Homeless
Assistance grant. Standard errors clustered at LEA level in parentheses. Data on homelessness and enrollment come from
EDFacts. Threshold is estimated by finding the state-by-year percentile of homeless students most increasing a district’s
discontinuous probability of receiving a McKinney-Vento grant within the bandwidth of five. The estimated threshold is then
used to find each district’s state-by-year distance to the threshold to be used as the running variable for the fuzzy regression
discontinuity. The first stage is predicting the likelihood of receiving a grant the following year, which is then used to estimate
effects. All models include state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-by-year fixed effects. Models with control variables
include enrollment, share of students that are Black and share Hispanic, estimated share in poverty, and whether urban, suburban,
or a town relative to being a rural district. Observations are school district by year. *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001
Table A1. Homelessness

Share Proficient
Without
Controls
With Controls

Share Proficient – 3rd Grade
Without
Controls
With Controls

Share Proficient – High School
Without
Controls
With Controls

BW: 5 percentiles
MV Grant
Recipient
Observations

-6.86***
(1.704)
2,885

-4.96* (2.00)

-6.67* (2.76)

-3.74 (3.13)

-2.75 (2.58)

-0.27 (3.02)

2,621

1,354

1,299

1,002

929

BW: 10 percentiles
MV Grant
Recipient
Observations

-4.79**
(1.57)
5,945

-3.02 (1.78)

-4.17 (2.44)

-1.71 (2.81)

-3.93 (2.22)

-1.62 (2.61)

5,379

2,580

2,478

1,888

1,736

140

BW: 5 percentiles, Quadratic Distance
MV Grant
-4.46 (2.72)
-2.43 (2.96) -0.98 (3.75)
3.32 (4.05)
-1.46 (3.74)
-0.61 (4.31)
Recipient
Observations
2,883
2,622
1,300
1,261
951
888
Notes: Each cell is a different model, with six models for each outcome. Each outcome has a model with a bandwidth of 5
percentiles, 10 percentiles, and 5 percentiles with quadratic distance instead of linear. Each then also is estimate without and
then with controls. MV Grant Recipient rows show estimated effect of a district’s receiving a McKinney-Vento Homeless
Assistance grant. Standard errors clustered at LEA level in parentheses. Data on homelessness and enrollment come from
EDFacts. Threshold is estimated by finding the state-by-year percentile of homeless students most increasing a district’s
discontinuous probability of receiving a McKinney-Vento grant within the bandwidth of five. The estimated threshold is then
used to find each district’s state-by-year distance to the threshold to be used as the running variable for the fuzzy regression
discontinuity. The first stage is predicting the likelihood of receiving a grant the following year, which is then used to estimate
effects. All models include state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-by-year fixed effects. Models with control variables
include enrollment, share of students that are Black and share Hispanic, estimated share in poverty, and whether urban,
suburban, or a town relative to being a rural district. Observations are school district by year. *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001
Table A2. Math Tests

Share Proficient
Without
Controls
With Controls
BW: 5 percentiles
MV Grant
Recipient
Observations
BW: 10 percentiles
MV Grant
Recipient
Observations

Share Proficient – 3rd Grade
Without
Controls
With Controls

Share Proficient – High School
Without
Controls
With Controls

-2.45 (1.91)

-0.51 (2.23)

-4.17 (2.71)

-0.89 (3.06)

-3.52 (3.41)

-3.55 (4.00)

2,886

2,620

1,355

1,297

1,038

957

-3.27 (1.73)

-1.50 (1.97)

-3.26 (2.35)

-1.06 (2.83)

-5.41 (2.91)

-5.27 (3.52)

5,955

5,389

2,570

2,467

1,951

1,795
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BW: 5 percentiles, Quadratic Distance
MV Grant
-8.24*** (3.13) -5.47 (3.23) -0.98 (3.57)
2.74 (4.96)
-5.14 (5.43)
-5.45 (5.84)
Recipient
Observations
2,896
2,636
1,296
1,257
1,005
939
Notes: Each cell is a different model, with six models for each outcome. Each outcome has a model with a bandwidth of 5
percentiles, 10 percentiles, and 5 percentiles with quadratic distance instead of linear. Each then also is estimate without and
then with controls. MV Grant Recipient rows show estimated effect of a district’s receiving a McKinney-Vento Homeless
Assistance grant. Standard errors clustered at LEA level in parentheses. Data on homelessness and enrollment come from
EDFacts. Threshold is estimated by finding the state-by-year percentile of homeless students most increasing a district’s
discontinuous probability of receiving a McKinney-Vento grant within the bandwidth of five. The estimated threshold is then
used to find each district’s state-by-year distance to the threshold to be used as the running variable for the fuzzy regression
discontinuity. The first stage is predicting the likelihood of receiving a grant the following year, which is then used to estimate
effects. All models include state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-by-year fixed effects. Models with control variables
include enrollment, share of students that are Black and share Hispanic, estimated share in poverty, and whether urban,
suburban, or a town relative to being a rural district. Observations are school district by year. *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001
Table A3. Reading/ELA Tests

Revenue from
City/County per student
Without
With
Controls
Controls
BW: 5 percentiles
MV Grant
-524 (272)
Recipient
Observations
2,961
BW: 10 percentiles
MV Grant
-318 (188)
Recipient
Observations
6,445

Title I Revenue per
student
Without
With
Controls
Controls

Student Support
Transportation
Expenditures per student Expenditures per student
Without
With
Without
With
Controls
Controls
Controls
Controls

-520 (296)

-114 (145)

-32 (34)

218 (820)

-101 (230)

-148 (213)

-75 (66)

2,499

2,961

2,499

2,961

2,499

2,961

2,499

-261**
(94)
5,458

-113 (210)

105 (90)
5,458

4,916
(4,325)
5,458

647 (760)

6,445

8,233
(6,375)
6,445

1,323
(1,086)
5,458

6,445
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BW: 5 percentiles, Quadratic Distance
MV Grant
-192 (351) -134 (313) -142 (274)
37 (50)
-556
433 (428) -670 (484)
57 (115)
Recipient
(1,910)
Observations
2,939
2,542
2,939
2,542
2,939
2,542
2,939
2,542
Notes: Each cell is a different model, with six models for each outcome. Each outcome has a model with a bandwidth of 5
percentiles, 10 percentiles, and 5 percentiles with quadratic distance instead of linear. Each then also is estimate without and
then with controls. MV Grant Recipient rows show estimated effect of a district’s receiving a McKinney-Vento Homeless
Assistance grant. Standard errors clustered at LEA level in parentheses. Data on homelessness and enrollment come from
EDFacts. Threshold is estimated by finding the state-by-year percentile of homeless students most increasing a district’s
discontinuous probability of receiving a McKinney-Vento grant within the bandwidth of five. The estimated threshold is then
used to find each district’s state-by-year distance to the threshold to be used as the running variable for the fuzzy regression
discontinuity. The first stage is predicting the likelihood of receiving a grant the following year, which is then used to estimate
effects. All models include state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-by-year fixed effects. Models with control variables
include enrollment, share of students that are Black and share Hispanic, estimated share in poverty, and whether urban, suburban,
or a town relative to being a rural district. Observations are school district by year. *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001
Table A4. Finances

Disability Allegations
per 1,000 students
Without
With
Controls
Controls
BW: 5 percentiles
MV Grant
0.10 (0.28)
Recipient
Observations
1,032
BW: 10 percentiles
MV Grant
0.76 (0.47)
Recipient
Observations
2,188

Race Allegations per
1,000 students
Without
With
Controls
Controls

0.01 (0.41)

0.88 (1.12)

0.10 (1.11)

842

1,032

0.39 (0.60)

2.44 (1.25)

1,830

2,188

In School Suspensions
per 1,000 students
Without
With
Controls
Controls

Out of School
Suspensions per 1,000
students
Without
With
Controls
Controls

842

7.66
(15.56)
1,035

10.21
(16.94)
844

-26.30
(16.46)
1,035

-4.71
(10.96)
844

3.19*
(1.32)
1,830

13.46
(18.83)
2,193

-4.26
(17.80)
1,833

15.80
(15.98)
2,193

-8.78
(10.07)
1,833

143

BW: 5 percentiles, Quadratic Distance
MV Grant
0.49 (0.59) 0.11 (0.61) 0.27 (1.05)
-0.94
-11.18
-29.79
-35.63
-10.59
Recipient
(1.00)
(32.70)
(30.76)
(28.51)
(17.66)
Observations
1,019
866
1,019
866
1,020
866
1,020
866
Notes: Each cell is a different model, with six models for each outcome. Each outcome has a model with a bandwidth of 5
percentiles, 10 percentiles, and 5 percentiles with quadratic distance instead of linear. Each then also is estimate without and
then with controls. MV Grant Recipient rows show estimated effect of a district’s receiving a McKinney-Vento Homeless
Assistance grant. Standard errors clustered at LEA level in parentheses. Data on homelessness and enrollment come from
EDFacts. Threshold is estimated by finding the state-by-year percentile of homeless students most increasing a district’s
discontinuous probability of receiving a McKinney-Vento grant within the bandwidth of five. The estimated threshold is then
used to find each district’s state-by-year distance to the threshold to be used as the running variable for the fuzzy regression
discontinuity. The first stage is predicting the likelihood of receiving a grant the following year, which is then used to estimate
effects. All models include state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-by-year fixed effects. Models with control variables
include enrollment, share of students that are Black and share Hispanic, estimated share in poverty, and whether urban, suburban,
or a town relative to being a rural district. Observations are school district by year. *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001
Table A5. Discipline

Above Threshold
Distance
Distance x Above
Distance2
Distance2 x Above

BW: 5
percentiles

BW: 5
percentiles

BW: 10
percentiles

BW: 10
percentiles

0.49***
(0.02)
-0.05***
(0.00)
-0.03***
(0.01)

0.43***
(0.02)
-0.04***
(0.01)
-0.04***
(0.01)

0.36***
(0.02)
-0.02***
(0.00)
-0.01***
(0.00)

0.33***
(0.02)
-0.01***
(0.00)
-0.01***
(0.00)

BW: 5
percentiles
Quadratic
0.43***
(0.03)
-0.06**
(0.02)
-0.04
(0.03)
0.01*
(0.01)
-0.01
(0.00)
No
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BW: 5
percentiles
Quadratic
0.40***
(0.04)
-0.06**
(0.02)
-0.02
(0.03)
0.01
(0.01)
-0.01
(0.00)
Yes
129
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Controls
No
Yes
No
Yes
Kleibergen-Paap Wald
435
291
475
346
rk F stat
Observations
4,218
3,312
8,824
7,094
4,179
3,404
Notes: Each column is a different model. The Above Threshold row show estimated relationship between being above the
estimated threshold and of district’s receiving a McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance grant. Standard errors clustered at LEA
level in parentheses. Data on homelessness and enrollment come from EDFacts. Threshold is estimated by finding the state-byyear percentile of homeless students most increasing a district’s discontinuous probability of receiving a McKinney-Vento grant
within the bandwidth of five. The estimated threshold is then used to find each district’s state-by-year distance to the threshold
to be used as the running variable for the fuzzy regression discontinuity. The first stage is predicting the likelihood of receiving
a grant the following year. All models include state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-by-year fixed effects. Models with
control variables include enrollment, share of students that are Black and share Hispanic, estimated share in poverty, and whether
urban, suburban, or a town relative to being a rural district. Observations are school district by year. *p<0.05 **p<0.01
***p<0.001
Table A6. First-Stage

MV Grant
Recipient
Observations

MV Grant
Recipient
Observations

Share
Sheltered
0.18*** (0.02)
46,880

Share
Proficient,
Math
-1.46***
(0.28)
26,429
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Disability
Allegations
per student
-0.12 (0.06)

Share
Doubled Up
2.30***
(0.12)
46,879

Revenue from
City/County per
student
-60.49**
(19.92)
38,544

Title I Revenue
per student
4.16 (4.62)

Student Support
Expenditures
per student
230.45 (142.63)

Transportation
Expenditures
per student
52.23* (22.93)

38,544

38,544

38,544

Share
Proficient –
3rd Grade,
Math
-1.22* (0.48)

Share
Proficient –
High School,
Math
-2.39*** (0.47)

Share
Proficient, ELA
-0.93** (0.28)

Share
Proficient – 3rd
Grade, ELA
-1.98*** (0.45)

Share
Proficient –
High School,
ELA
-1.90*** (0.52)

10,350

7,404

26,535

10,289

7,659

Race
Allegations
per student
-0.07 (0.09)

In School
Suspensions
per student
2.27 (1.72)

Out of School
Suspensions
per student
2.41* (1.20)

MV Grant
Recipient
Observations
9,347
9,347
9,357
9,357
Notes: Each cell is a different outcome. MV Grant Recipient rows show estimated effect of a district’s receiving a McKinneyVento Homeless Assistance grant with standard errors clustered at LEA level in parentheses. Data on homelessness and
enrollment come from EDFacts. Models include controls variables, state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-by-year fixed
effects. Control variables include enrollment, share of students that are Black and share Hispanic, estimated share in poverty,
and whether urban, suburban, or a town relative to being a rural district. Observations are school district by year. *p<0.05
**p<0.01 ***p<0.001
Table B1. Naïve Results of Receiving Grant

Figure B1. Distribution of Estimated Thresholds

Notes: Data on homelessness and enrollment come from EDFacts. Threshold is estimated
by finding the state-by-year percentile of homeless students most increasing a district’s
discontinuous probability of receiving a McKinney-Vento grant within the bandwidth of
five. The estimated threshold is then used to find each district’s state-by-year distance to
the threshold to be used as the running variable for the fuzzy regression discontinuity. This
graph shows distribution of estimated percentiles. The x-axis shows districts’ state-by-year
percentile of homelessness estimated threshold.
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Figure B2. Levels of Student Homelessness and McKinney-Vento Funding

Notes: Notes: Data come from Section 1.9 of Consolidated State Performance Reports.
Vertical line is year marks when districts received the increase in McKinney-Vento
funding.
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